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Abstract 
Background: Living with dementia has wide-ranging consequences across both 
social and psychological domains.  Deficits in memory functioning, especially 
autobiographical memory, and changes in the sense of self have been found to be 
salient experiences of people with dementia, which may lead to emotional distress.  
Specifically, discrepancies between how the person sees themself now (actual self) 
and who they would ideally like to be (ideal self), or ought to be (ought self) in the 
absence of the debilitating effects of dementia may be pertinent to levels of 
emotional distress. 
Aims:  This study attempted to explore the relationships between self-discrepancies, 
autobiographical memory, and emotional distress in people with mild dementia.  
Method: Thirty-three people living in the community with mild dementia were 
recruited from Older People’s Community Mental Health Teams, charities, and a day 
care centre.  Participants included 23 people with Alzheimer’s disease, 4 with 
vascular dementia, and 6 with mixed dementia, ranging from 64-88 years of age.  
Participants completed the Selves Questionnaire (measuring self-discrepancies), the 
Self-defining memory task (measuring autobiographical memory), and the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale (measuring emotional distress).   
Results: Correlational analyses revealed that greater discrepancies between the 
actual and ideal selves, and a higher number of reported dementia-related self-
attributes were significantly associated with increased emotional distress.  A 
significant relationship was also found between recall of fewer integrative 
autobiographical memories and higher levels of emotional distress.
xii 
 
Conclusions: The current study provides preliminary evidence of the importance of 
self-discrepancies and autobiographical memory in understanding emotional distress 
in people with mild dementia.  The way in which people with dementia 
conceptualise themselves as having a dementia-related self-concept also seems to 
play a key role in the experience of emotional distress.  Further exploration of these 
relationships would be valuable to help develop future interventions to alleviate 
emotional distress in people with mild dementia.  
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1. Chapter One - Introduction 
1.1 Chapter Overview 
Dementia has been described as the modern epidemic of later life and the 
most feared diagnosis by older adults (Bond & Corner, 2001).  It is a progressive, 
degenerative disease characterised by cognitive decline and impaired memory, 
thinking and behaviour (Bates, Boote, & Beverley, 2003).  It is also well known for 
its devastating effects on the sufferer, and as yet there is no cure (Wilson, 2008). 
As people in the United Kingdom (UK) are increasingly living longer, the 
prevalence of dementia is inevitably rising (Alzheimer’s Society, 2007).  It has 
therefore become vital to improve our understanding of this debilitating disease in 
order to minimise distress and improve quality of life (QOL).  
The deficits in memory functioning associated with dementia have been well 
researched, especially impairments in autobiographical memory (AM) (Graham & 
Hodges, 1997; Greene & Hodges, 1996).  These impairments have been linked to 
both a loss of self in dementia and a reduction in QOL (Jetten, Haslam, Pugliese, 
Tonks, & Haslam, 2010).  However, while the impact of dementia on the sense of 
self has recently received growing interest in the literature, little is known about how 
the self, specifically self-discrepancies, relates to emotional distress in people with 
dementia (hereafter referred to as PWD).  Therefore, the present study aims to 
examine whether there is a relationship between AM, self-discrepancies and 
emotional distress in PWD.   
First, this chapter will describe dementia, the way it is diagnosed, its 
subtypes, prevalence, and the ways in which it can be managed.  Second, the impact 
of dementia on social and emotional functioning will be discussed, and how these 
changes may influence the sense of self.  Third, the role of the self and identity in 
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dementia is explored, including an examination of the models of the self that are 
related to dementia.  Self-discrepancy theory (SDT; Higgins, 1987) will be 
considered here.  Fourth, the definition of AM will be outlined, including its 
functions, a description of the models incorporating AM and the self, and an outline 
of the AM deficits seen in dementia.  The relationship between AM and 
psychopathology is also discussed.  Fifth, a review of the current literature linking 
AM, the self and emotional distress in dementia will be presented, including a 
critique of the findings.  Finally, the rationale for the current study and study aims 
will be outlined, along with the research questions and hypotheses to be investigated.    
1.2 Dementia 
1.2.1 Definition and Diagnosis 
 The definition of dementia has evolved throughout the years from a non-
specific notion of organic brain syndrome to a more precise operationalised concept 
(Ballard & Bannister, 2005).  Historically, dementia has been described with an 
emphasis on memory loss.  However, in more recent decades, the definition has 
become more inclusive to comprise overall decline in intellectual functioning as well 
as loss of memory (e.g., American Psychiatric Association; APA, 1987; World 
Health Organization; WHO, 1992).  Dementia is also often described as a condition 
that is usually chronic and progressive in nature (e.g., Graff, 2009; WHO, 1992).  It 
is distinguishable from the normal cognitive decline that is associated with ageing.  
Therefore, a diagnosis is only provided where evidence exists that a person’s 
memory and cognitive impairment is higher than would be expected as part of the 
normal ageing process. 
There are numerous sets of criteria used to define and diagnose dementia, 
including those outlined in the International Classification of Diseases (10
th
 revision) 
3 
 
(ICD-10; WHO, 1993) and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (4
th
 edition) (DSM-IV; APA, 1994).  Criteria can also vary depending on 
the type of dementia being diagnosed.  The different types of dementia will be 
considered below in section 1.2.2.  
Arguably, the most widely used criteria for the definition and diagnosis of 
dementia are those included in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994).  In this manual, dementia 
is defined as memory impairment and at least one of the following: aphasia 
(impairment of language ability), apraxia (loss of ability to carry out learned 
purposeful movements), agnosia (inability to recognise objects, sounds, people, 
shapes or smells), or disturbances in executive functioning (the ability to think 
abstractly, as well as plan, organise and manage time and space).  These cognitive 
deficits must also be severe enough to interfere with work, social or relationship 
functioning.  The criteria also suggests that delirium or disturbances of 
consciousness should be absent when making a diagnosis of dementia.  
 In addition to the use of the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), 
dementia may be screened using semi-structured clinical interviews, such as the 
Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) or 
the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination Revised (ACE-R; Mioshi, Dawson, 
Mitchell, Arnold, & Hodges, 2006).  Comprehensive history-taking from both the 
person presenting with difficulties and an informant (usually a relative) is also 
crucial in the process of diagnosing dementia (Hodges, 2007).  Neuropsychological 
testing may also be employed to provide clinicians with a profile of a person’s 
performance on a variety of tasks, which focus on specific aspects of brain 
functioning (Blackwell, Dunn, Owen, & Sahakian, 2005).  A plethora of other 
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cognitive screening instruments are available to use but their descriptions are beyond 
the scope of this thesis (for detailed explanations see Hodges, 1997). 
 Furthermore, the diagnostic process involves the differential diagnosis of 
dementia based on subtypes.  This can be determined in various ways, including the 
use of standardised cognitive assessments (as described above), specific 
neuropsychological profiles, and neuroimaging techniques (e.g., Ballard & 
Bannister, 2005).  Neuroimaging techniques are made up of structural imaging scans 
(e.g., magnetic resonance imaging [MRI] and computed tomography [CT]), and 
functional imaging scans (e.g., positron emission tomography [PET], functional 
magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI], and single photon emission computed 
tomography [SPECT]).  Structural imagining is used to identify the presence and 
absence of biological features that are specific to certain dementias (Barber & 
O’Brien, 2005), whereas functional imagery enables the measurement of cerebral 
function (O’Brien & Barber, 2000).  Both can assist in diagnosing dementia, 
however, Ballard and Bannister (2005) recommend that the diagnosis of dementia 
and its subtypes is best achieved by combining clinical, neuropsychological, and 
neuroimaging indices over time. 
In the last decade there has been a call for the early detection and diagnosis 
of dementia (Department of Health; DoH, 2001, 2009; National Institute for Health 
& Clinical Excellence; NICE, 2007).  NICE (2007) state that the early detection of 
dementia can help PWD and their families by “dispelling anxiety about changes in 
memory, thinking, mood or behaviour and allowing mobilisation of resources that 
will be needed in the future” (p. 144).  Chang and Silverman (2004) also found that 
early recognition and active therapy at this early stage can delay the subsequent need 
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for nursing home care, as well as reduce the risk of misdiagnosis and inappropriate 
management. 
1.2.2 Subtypes of Dementia  
 There are many different types of dementia, which can be differentiated 
based on their aetiology.  The subtypes of dementia typically fall into one of three 
categories: cortical (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease [AD] and fronto-temporal dementia 
[FTD]), subcortical (e.g., Huntington’s disease and dementia with Lewy bodies 
[DLB]), or a combination of both (Hodges, 1997).  
Some of the more common types of dementia include AD, vascular dementia 
(VaD), DLB and FTD.  Some dementias also occur as a result of the direct 
physiological effects of a medical condition, such as Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease 
(CJD) or acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) encephalopathy.  For the 
purposes of this study, only AD, VaD and mixed dementias were investigated.  This 
is in view of their distinct impairments in AM (see section 1.5.4), which is one of the 
key variables being examined in the present study.  These dementias will therefore 
be the focus of this chapter.   
AD is characterised by loss of memory, especially the memory for learning 
new information or recalling recent events.  As the disease progresses deficits in 
praxis (e.g., motor activity), language, and executive functioning start to show, as 
well as behavioural and psychiatric disturbances (also known as behavioural and 
psychological symptoms of dementia, or BPSD) (NICE, 2007).  BPSD may include 
depression, agitation, disinhibition, apathy, psychosis (hallucinations and delusions), 
aggression, and changes in eating habits (Howard, Ballard, O’Brien, & Burns, 2001; 
NICE, 2007). 
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The onset of AD is often gradual with a progressive decline in cognition and 
the ability to function.  Although there may be brief plateaus in the illness, decline is 
typically consistent, with a tendency to accelerate or increase over time (NICE, 
2007).  Neuroimaging suggests that medial temporal lobe atrophy (MTA) is a 
consistently recognised structural difference in AD as compared to age-matched 
controls (Barber & O’Brien, 2005).  Additionally, Hyman and Trojanowski (1997) 
have reported senile (neuritic) plaques and neurofibrillary tangles in AD, which 
indicates that early in the disease the medial temporal regions, including 
hippocampal formation are most affected (Braak & Braak, 1991).  The 
parahippocampal cortex, and to a lesser degree, the parietal lobes (Ouchi et al., 1998; 
Stout et al., 1999) have also been found to be affected.  It has been suggested that the 
disconnection of all of these brain regions from associated cortex is responsible for 
AM loss (Guela, 1998; Hyman, 1984, 1986, 1990).  The long-term storage of remote 
autobiographical memories is independent of the hippocampus (Hou, Miller, & 
Kramer, 2005), which appears to account for the temporal gradient of AM in AD 
(i.e., impaired recall of remote autobiographical memories, relative to recent 
memories) (Graham & Hodges, 1997; Kopelman, 1989).  
VaD is typified by mild memory deficits and dysexecutive syndrome (i.e., 
impairment in goal formulation, initiation, planning, organising, sequencing, and 
executing) (Jokinen et al., 2006; Mahler & Cummings, 1991).  However, the 
cognitive impairments of VaD can be varied, ranging from symptoms associated 
with cortical stroke (e.g., difficulties in understanding and problems in expressing 
thoughts) to those related to subcortical disease (e.g., slowness, forgetfulness and 
depression) (Kempler, 2005).  Clinical patterns of VaD also differ depending on the 
blood vessels involved in the brain (e.g., large or small), the number, size and 
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location of infarcts, and the stage of the disease (Jeong, Kim, Seo, & Na, 2009; 
Kempler, 2005).  
The BPSD of VaD usually includes personality changes, depression, 
emotional lability, inertia, emotional bluntness and psychomotor retardation (i.e., 
slowing down of thoughts and physical movements) (Erkinjuntti & Gauthier, 2010).  
Several studies have found that behavioural and emotional changes are more 
profound in VaD than AD (Aharon-Peretz, Kliot, & Tomer, 2000; Fuh, Wang, & 
Cummings, 2005), including higher levels of depression and anxiety (Padovani et al., 
1995).  Neurological symptoms of VaD typically involve gait disorder, imbalance 
and falls, dysarthria (i.e., problems in articulating speech), dysphagia (i.e., 
difficulties in swallowing), and urinary incontinence (Pohjasvaara, Mäntylä, 
Ylikoski, Kaste, & Erkinjuntti, 2003).  
VaD is caused by ischemic or hemorrhagic cerebrovascular disease, as well 
as hypoperfusive ischemic cerebral injury resulting from cardiovascular and 
circulatory disorders (Román, 2004; Román et al., 1993).  It is characterised by a 
step-wise deterioration (some recovery after worsening) and fluctuating cognitive 
functions (Erkinjuntti & Hachinski, 1993; Román et al., 1993).  The neuropathology 
of VaD is similar to stroke with infarctions or lacunes concentrated either in the deep 
grey matter (e.g., basal ganglia and thalamus), or the cerebral white matter (also 
known as Binswanger disease) (Erkinjuntti et al., 2000).  Injury to the basal ganglia 
may account for subsequent movement and coordination difficulties (Moretti, Torre, 
& Pizzolato, 2006).  Moreover, ischemic lesions are particularly apparent in the 
prefrontal subcortical circuit, including the prefrontal cortex in VaD (Cummings, 
1993).  This damage to the frontal lobe is reflected in the dysexecutive syndrome 
common in VaD (Looi & Sachdev, 1999; McPherson & Cummings, 1996).  People 
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with VaD also show hippocampal neuronal loss (Du et al., 2002; Kril, Patel, 
Harding, & Halliday, 2002), which is known to predict severity of cognitive 
impairment (Fein et al., 2000). 
Dementia can also have a mixed aetiology, which is primarily made up of 
AD and VaD (Ballard & Bannister, 2005).  Kalaria and Ballard (1999) have reported 
that at least 40% of PWD have an overlap of vascular and neurodegenerative 
pathologies.  According to Rockwood (2000), mixed AD and VaD can be diagnosed 
based on a history of focal symptoms (including transient ischemic attacks and 
strokes), sudden onset, and sudden worsening of otherwise typical AD.  Symptoms 
are believed to follow the same pattern of AD, vascular dementia or a mixture of the 
two (Alzheimer’s Association, 2011).  
The differential diagnosis of dementia is based on various types of criteria.  
For example, the National Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders 
and the Stroke and the Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders Association Joint 
Task Force (NINCDS-ARDA) (McKhann et al., 1984) released criteria for the 
diagnosis and classification of AD based upon the presence of possible, probable, or 
definite AD (and the corresponding standards for each of these categories).  For the 
diagnosis of VaD, the longest established criteria were devised by Hachinski et al., 
(1975) and the Hachinski ischemic score.  More recently, the State of California 
Alzheimer’s Disease Diagnostic and Treatment Centres (ADDTC) (Chui et al., 1992) 
and the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and the Stroke and the 
Association Internationale pour la Recherche at L’Enseignement en Neurosciences 
(NINDS AIREN) (Román et al., 1993) have outlined criteria for the diagnosis of 
VaD. 
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However, the overlap between AD and VaD can make differential diagnosis 
difficult.  Indeed, autopsy studies revealed that pure AD and pure cases of VaD are 
uncommon (Hulette et al., 1997; Nolan, Lino, Seligmann, & Blass, 1998).  Some 
studies also suggest that 30-50% of mixed AD and VaD cases are misclassified as 
VaD (Gold et al., 2002).    
1.2.3 Prevalence  
A recent report published by the Alzheimer’s Society (Dementia UK; 
Alzheimer’s Society, 2007), indicates that there are approximately 750,000 people in 
the United Kingdom (UK) living with a form of dementia.  Of these, 16,000 people 
are under the age of 65.  Prevalence rates from this report suggest that dementia 
increases with age.  For example, dementia is believed to occur in 1 in 1400 people 
between the ages of 40-64; 1 in 100 people aged between 65-69; 1 in 25 people aged 
70-79; and 1 in 6 people aged 80 and above.  With people in the UK increasingly 
living longer it is estimated that by 2021 there will be approximately 940,000 PWD 
in the UK, which is set to rise to over 1.7 million people by 2051.  AD is reported as 
the most common form of dementia, accounting for 62% of all PWD.  This is 
followed by VaD (17%), mixed dementia (AD and VaD) (10%), DLB (4%), FTD 
(2%), and Parkinson’s dementia (2%).  The remaining 3% is made up of other 
dementias.  While AD is currently the most prevalent form of dementia, projections 
exist that with progressive ageing, VaD will become the most common form of 
dementia (Román, 2003). 
1.2.4 Interventions 
 Interventions for the management of dementia may target social, 
psychological, cognitive, or behavioural outcomes.  The two main types of 
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interventions consist of pharmacological and psychosocial approaches, both of which 
aim to improve these outcomes to some degree. 
1.2.4.1 Pharmacological interventions.  Several pharmacological 
interventions for dementia are available and recommended by NICE (2007).  These 
include three acetylcholinesterase inhibitors (AChEIs): rivastigmine (Exelon), 
donepezil (Aricept), and galantamine (Reminyl).  Memantine (Namenda) has also 
recently been introduced for treating moderate to severe AD (NICE, 2007).  It is 
believed to work by affecting glutamate, a brain chemical involved in memory and 
learning.  AChEIs are used to manage the cholinergic dysfunction that is common in 
AD (Bowen, Smith, White, & Davison, 1976) and VaD (Court, Perry, & Kalaria, 
2002).  However, currently no drugs are specifically licensed for the management of 
VaD, but AChEIs and memantine may be prescribed as part of a clinical trial or at 
clinical discretion (NICE, 2007).  AChEIs work by increasing levels of acetylcholine 
in the brain (a chemical responsible for memory functioning via the transmission of 
information between brain cells).   
The efficacy of all three AChEIs used to manage AD has been found to be 
similar (Ritchie, Ames, Clayton, & Lai, 2004).  In a review by Birks (2006), which 
was based on a large number of randomised, double-blind trials, these AChEIs 
demonstrated modest effects on cognition, activities of daily living (ADL), and 
global functioning when compared to a placebo.  Memantine has also been found to 
be effective in managing AD (see Tampi & van Dyck, 2007).  Some large-scale 
clinical trials have found donepezil, galantamine, rivastigmine, and memantine to be 
efficacious in helping with some of the symptoms of VaD (Black et al., 2003; 
Auchus et al., 2007; Moretti, Torre, Antonella, Cazzato, & Pizzolato, 2008; 
Orgogozo, Rigaud, Stӧffler, Mӧbius, & Forette, 2002, respectively).  However, 
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evidence presented in the NICE (2007) guidelines suggested that the effectiveness of 
these drugs in managing VaD is less promising.  It was concluded that any possible 
benefits to people are unlikely to outweigh the potential increased risk of adverse 
events (e.g., side effects).   
Drugs for the alleviation of BPSD include antipsychotics, anxiolytics and 
sedatives, antidepressants, anticonvulsants, and beta-blockers (see Profenno, Tariot, 
Loy, & Ismail, 2005). 
 1.2.4.2 Psychosocial interventions.  In view of the interplay between 
neurological and psychosocial factors associated with dementia (Aminzadeh, 
Byszewski, Molnar, & Eisener, 2007; Kitwood, 1990), in recent years there has been 
a shift towards psychosocial interventions to help PWD (see Bates et al., 2004 for a 
review).  The emphasis of these interventions is on improving QOL, which has been 
deemed as important as medically managing the disease (Grypdonck, 1996, as cited 
in Steeman, Dierckz de Casterlé, Godderis, & Grypdonck, 2006).  
Numerous psychosocial interventions to help with the effects of dementia 
have been developed, including psychodynamic approaches, reminiscence and life 
review therapy, support groups, family therapy, cognitive/behavioural approaches, 
and memory training.  However, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to outline all 
of these approaches (for a review of interventions see Moniz-Cook & Manthorpe, 
2009).  Given that the present study is focused on the early stages of dementia, only 
interventions targeted at people with mild to moderate dementia will be discussed. 
In reviewing psychosocial approaches for people with mild to moderate 
dementia, Bates et al. (2004) examined four studies which focused on procedural 
memory stimulation, reality orientation (RO), and counselling.  The former involved 
training in ADLs, including the use of cues, reinforcement, and prompts to get 
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people to execute the tasks.  RO was developed by Folsom (1968) in order to help 
reduce confusion in PWD living in institutions.  The aim of the intervention is to 
present orientating information during interactions and the use of props (e.g., clocks, 
signs, and calendars) to allow for orientation in the person’s environment.  In Bates 
et al. review, counselling was described as providing an opportunity for people to 
express their concerns and receive validated information about their dementia.  No 
evidence was found for the effectiveness of counselling or procedural memory 
stimulation.  However, some findings indicated that RO is effective in improving 
cognitive ability in AD (Baldelli et al., 1993; Zanetti et al., 1995), with a 
demonstrable long-term gain at follow-up (Zanetti et al., 1995).  
NICE (2007) recommends cognitive stimulation, specifically group cognitive 
stimulation therapy (CST), to help with cognitive symptoms and general functioning 
in mild to moderate dementia.  This approach is derived from RO (Folsom, 1968) 
and cognitive stimulation (Breuil et al., 1994).  It typically consists of 14 weekly 
sessions aimed at information processing through themed activities to stimulate and 
engage PWD, while providing the social benefits of a group setting.  CST has been 
shown to improve cognitive abilities and QOL (Spector et al., 2003) in PWD, and 
reduce depression (Spector, Orrell, Davies, & Woods, 2001).  However, Livingston 
and Cooper (2010) note that overall there is inconsistent evidence for the utility of 
CST in helping to improve neuropsychiatric symptoms in dementia. 
The NICE (2007) guidelines also advocate the use of cognitive-behavioural 
therapy for the management of depression and/or anxiety in people in the earlier 
stages of dementia.  In order to improve memory in the early stages of dementia, it is 
also suggested that life review therapy (i.e., using material from the past, such as 
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photos, to stimulate memory), and/or a cognitive rehabilitation approach (i.e., 
memory strategies) be utilised. 
Interventions based on aspects of the self in dementia have also showed 
promising, yet preliminary, results in improving well-being and behavioural 
outcomes in people in the moderate to severe stages of dementia (Cohen-Mansfield, 
Parpura-Gill, & Golander, 2006; Romero & Wenz, 2001).   
1.2.5 Summary  
 Dementia is a devastating and progressive disease, which involves significant 
memory loss and overall decline in intellectual and social functioning.  Dementia is 
becoming increasingly prevalent as the UK population lives longer.  The most 
common types of dementia are AD and VaD, although problems with diagnosis and 
the overlap between the neuropathology of AD and VaD mean that pure cases of AD 
and VaD are rarely seen.  Diagnosis of dementia is further complicated by the use of 
numerous sets of criteria.  However, the most comprehensive way of diagnosing 
dementia is via a combination of established criteria, and clinical, 
neuropsychological, and neuroimaging indices over time.  Several pharmacological 
and psychosocial interventions are available for the management of dementia, which 
may be targeted towards improving cognitive and social functioning, or the 
neuropsychiatric symptoms of dementia.  The next section will outline the impact of 
dementia, including the social and emotional consequences for the people with the 
disease. 
1.3 Impact of Dementia 
 The impact of dementia can be wide-ranging, and has far reaching 
consequences for PWD, their care-givers, healthcare providers, and the broader 
society and economy as a whole (Luengo-Fernandez, Leal, & Gray, 2010). In view 
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of projections that dementia will become the “silent epidemic” of the 21st century 
(Román, 2003; Royall, 2004), the repercussions for the UK healthcare system and 
economy are immense.  Dementia is thought to cost the UK economy £23 billion per 
year, which is nearly twice the cost of cancer per year (Luengo-Fernandez et al., 
2010). Carers of PWD are one of the most vulnerable groups of carers, suffering 
from high levels of depression, burden and mental distress, guilt, and other 
psychological problems (National Audit Office, 2007; NICE, 2007; Schneider, 
Murray, Banerjee, & Mann, 1999).  Indeed, numerous studies have looked at ways to 
improve psychological well-being and quality of life in carers of PWD (e.g., 
Charlesworth, 2001; Charlesworth et al., 2008).  However, in view of the current 
study’s aims the next section will specifically focus on the impact of dementia on the 
people with the disease.  
1.3.1 Social Consequences  
BPSD are common in dementia, with a lifetime risk of up to 90% (Davis et 
al., 1997; Marin et al., 1997).  These symptoms have all been found to be present in 
milder forms of dementia (e.g., Moran et al., 2004).  Changes in the brain may be 
accountable for many BPSD (e.g., Cummings & Back, 1998).  For instance, the loss 
of neurons in the locus coereuleus found in depressed people with AD (Forstl et al., 
1992; Hoogendijk et al., 1999) may make the person with dementia more susceptible 
to emotional distress.  Moreover, the symptoms in isolation are frequently distressing 
for PWD (Gilley, Whalen, Wilson, & Bennett, 1991).  It has been suggested that 
certain psychological symptoms, such as depression, serve to exacerbate emotional 
distress, as well as reduce QOL, and increase cognitive and functional impairment 
(Banerjee et al., 2006; Greenwald et al., 1989).  BPSD are also known to contribute 
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significantly to economic cost (O’Brien, Shompe, & Caro, 2000), and increased 
levels of clinical depression in carers (Ballard, Eastwood, Gahir, & Wilcock, 1996).  
Impairments in cognitive functioning, ADLs, and behavioural and 
psychological disturbances have a significant effect on the perceived QOL of PWD 
(Shin, Carter, Masterman, Fairbanks, & Cummings, 2005).  Several studies have 
found that reduced QOL in PWD has been associated with increased levels of 
emotional distress for the person (Donaldson, Tarrier, & Burns, 1998; Logsdon, 
Gibbons, McCurry, & Teri, 2002).  Reductions in QOL and subsequent low mood 
may be further compounded by physical problems associated with older age (e.g., 
Hopman-Rock, Kraaimaat, & Bijlsma, 1997).  Assessing QOL of PWD has therefore 
become an important area of investigation in order to help target interventions to 
improve these difficulties (e.g., Hurt et al., 2008).  
The presence of BPSD, reduction in ADLs, and subsequent QOL represents 
excess disability for PWD (e.g., Bleathman & Morton, 1994).  This may lead to 
decreased confidence and consequently a reduction in social contact and 
environmental stimulation, thereby contributing to lowered well-being (Woods & 
Britton, 1985).  This may be compounded by the “malignant social psychology” 
described by Kitwood (1997, p.45) (see section 1.4.2.1 for a further description of 
this model), whereby undermining and discouraging social interactions and care 
processes lead to a reduction in self-efficacy and therefore further damaging 
interactions (Sabat, 1994).  
These changes and interactions combined may lead to negative effects on 
PWDs sense of personhood, self-confidence, self-esteem, and the use of maladaptive 
coping mechanisms (e.g., Bahro, Silber, & Sunderland, 1995; Bamford et al., 2004; 
Bender & Cheston, 1997).  Indeed, consideration of how PWD cope and adjust to the 
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changes associated with the disease is crucial to providing a psychological 
understanding of dementia (Cottrell & Schultz, 1993).  Numerous studies have 
explored the coping strategies and phenomenological experiences of people with 
early-stage dementia (for a review see Steeman et al., 2006).  The findings of these 
studies indicate that PWD go through a process of adaptation (Keady & Nolan, 
1995; Pratt & Wilkinson, 2001), whereby they attempt to integrate the disease into 
their lives by developing strategies to preserve their self-identity (Steeman et al., 
2006).  
Clare (2000) developed a model of psychological response to the onset of 
dementia, wherein the impact of cognitive change is experienced in the context of 
the individual’s self-concept and social relationships.  She posits that PWD engage 
in the following five processes: registering the changes; reacting to the changes; 
trying to explain the changes; experiencing the emotional impact of the changes; and 
attempting to adjust to the changes. In her study, she found that PWD experience 
tension between their need to put on a protective layer to maintain their prior self-
concept and their need to confront the changes, and allow these to be integrated 
within their current self-concept.  In line with this view, it has been proposed that 
possible selves (i.e., images of the self in the future) (Markus & Nurius, 1986) are 
important in understanding changes in the self-concept as a result of life transitions 
(Hooker & Kaus, 1994). 
As this interaction between neurological impairment and social psychology 
takes its course, the social life of PWD tends to dwindle away (Kitwood, 1990).  In 
turn, it has been suggested by Sabat and Harré (1992) that this may inhibit an 
individual’s sense of social identity, which requires interaction with others in order 
to be materialised.  Indeed, these authors found that personal identity may persist 
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even into the advanced stage of dementia, whereas social identity may be diminished 
or even lost over the course of the disease.  
1.3.2 Emotional Consequences 
Given these vast and devastating changes, it is unsurprising that PWD may 
experience emotional distress in relation to the discovery that they have, and will 
need to adapt to, a chronic and irreversible disease.  Indeed, as with many chronic 
and terminal illnesses, the onset of dementia places major demands on coping 
resources (Cottrell & Lein, 1993).  This process of adaptation to dementia involves 
changes in the sense of self, psychosocial adjustment, and prospects for the future 
(Frazier, Hooker, Johnson, & Kaus, 2000).  The memory impairments associated 
with dementia may be one cause of emotional distress (a more detailed discussion of 
the memory deficits in dementia are presented in section 1.5.4).  For example, Clare 
and Wilson (1997, p. 41) summarised the emotional impact memory difficulties can 
have: 
Memory is a very important part of our sense of who we are…It is no 
surprise that memory problems often have major emotional consequences, 
including feelings of loss and anger and increased levels of anxiety. 
This distress may be further compounded by the social, behavioural, and 
psychological problems related to dementia, as outlined in section 1.3.1.  Some of 
the responses that PWD have in relation to changes in memory functioning are 
outlined by Clare (2003), who found that individuals’ sense of their self varied in 
terms of their reaction to memory changes.  These ranged from “self-maintaining” 
(i.e., working to maintain an existing identity), to “self-adjusting” (i.e., developing a 
new sense of self by incorporating changes into their new identity).   In line with this 
view, Romero and Wenz (2001) argue that when PWD find it too difficult to 
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integrate new experiences into their prior self-structures, they will react with shame, 
depression and/or aggression. 
PWDs awareness of their difficulties is also related to higher levels of 
emotional distress, including dysthymia and anxiety (Aalten, Van Valen, Clare, 
Kenny, & Verhey, 2005).  Indeed, people with early-stage dementia are likely to 
have insight into their illness for a longer period of time and therefore have more 
time to experience distress (Brierley et al., 2003).  This is supported by the findings 
of Holtzer et al. (2005) whereby the prevalence of depressive symptoms in AD were 
found to decrease over the course of the disease, with as much as a 30% drop in the 
fourth and fifth year from baseline to follow up.  However, other studies have found 
no association between the level of cognitive impairment in dementia and depression 
(Cummings, Miller, Hill, & Neshres, 1987; Haupt, Kurz, & Greifenhagen, 1995). 
Estimated rates of depression in dementia range from 30% to 50% (Taylor et 
al., 2003).  In AD, major depression or clinically significant depressive symptoms 
can be found in between 17% and 40% of people (Holtzer et al., 2005; Wragg & 
Jeste, 1989).  Individuals with subcortical dementia, such as VaD, are more likely to 
experience depression than those with AD (Sobin & Sackeim, 1997).  It has been 
suggested that a history of depression doubles the risk of developing dementia, 
particularly AD, due to damage to the hippocampus through excessive 
glucocorticoid secretion (Jorm, 2001).  There is also a general consensus that late-
onset depression may be a prodromal feature of dementia (Ritchie, Gilham, Ledesért, 
Touchon, & Kotzki, 1999; Yaffe et al., 1999), although as noted by Clare (2004), the 
overlap between dementia and depression is still unclear.  Anxiety appears to be less 
common in dementia, with 12.8% reported in a sample of 704 PWD (Diaz et al., 
2005).  
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1.3.2.1 Self-regulation model of adjustment to illness.  Another area that 
may be relevant to mood and well-being in dementia is the self-regulation model of 
adjustment to illness (SRM; Leventhal, Nerenz, & Steele, 1984).  This model 
proposes that in order to make sense of their illness, people develop illness 
representations.  These are conceptualisations that people have of their illness based 
on them noticing their symptoms, gaining information from sources, and comparing 
these ideas with existing beliefs about health and illness.  These illness cognitions 
fall into five broad areas: illness identity (i.e., the label and perceived symptoms of 
the illness); beliefs about the cause of the illness; the time line of the illness (i.e., 
chronic, acute or episodic); ideas about the controllability and curability of the 
illness; and the perceived consequences of the illness for the person.  According to 
the SRM, illness representations mediate the emotional responses and coping 
behaviours associated with the illness.  Negative illness representations among 
people with a chronic illness in regard to a strong illness identity and beliefs about 
serious consequences of their illness have been associated with higher levels of 
depression and anxiety (e.g., Vaughan, Morrison, & Miller, 2003).  Therefore, the 
SRM may be useful in providing a framework in which to understand individual 
differences in coping and well-being among PWD (Clare, 2002; Pearce, Clare & 
Pistrang, 2002).  
Clare, Goater, and Woods (2006) tested the SRM in people with early-stage 
dementia and found that over half of the people they interviewed reported negative 
emotional consequences as a result of suffering from dementia.  These included: 
frustration, anger, embarrassment, self-blame, feeling useless and depressed, feelings 
of loss and being cut off, and wishing that one would rather be dead.  Self-reported 
depression and anxiety were higher in people who described a smaller repertoire of 
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coping strategies.  Those people who scored in the clinical range for depression had 
negative illness representations about the controllability of their illness of dementia 
(i.e., they believed that either nothing could be done about their diagnosis of 
dementia or were unable to describe any means of control). 
1.3.3 Summary 
 In summary, the consequences of dementia are wide-ranging.  Social 
problems, adjustment issues, memory deficits, and BPSD all appear to be related to 
emotional distress in PWD, as well as changes in the sense of self.  The next section 
will consider the relationship between the self and identity and dementia, including a 
discussion of the models of the self that are related to dementia.  SDT (Higgins, 
1987) will also be discussed here. 
1.4 Self, Identity and Dementia 
1.4.1 Self and Identity in Dementia 
The self can be viewed as the source of life span experiences, action 
orientations, and motivational states (Whitbourne, 1985).  Identity is considered to 
be a multidimensional construct (Cohen-Mansfield et al., 2006) and a sub-
component of the self, which incorporates a range of self-relevant domains (Fitts, 
1965).  Barrs (1997) conceptualised identity as a sense of coherence and continuity 
over time, which provides a unifying context for personal experience.  The inherent 
difficulties in defining the self and identity were highlighted in a recent review by 
Caddell and Clare (2010), which examined the impact of dementia on self and 
identity.  They highlighted 33 studies which measure the self, or components of the 
self, in dementia.  These studies focused on: social constructionist and interactionist 
perspectives of the self; embodied selfhood; studies using thematic analyses to 
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investigate the self and identity; narrative self; self-recognition; self-knowledge; 
identity based on AM; and the self in relation to role identities.  
The overall findings from this review suggest that there is some deterioration 
in aspects of the self or identity, but that the self is preserved to some degree 
throughout the course of dementia.  However, it is uncertain whether this persistence 
of self is based on a current or outdated sense of self.  It is also still unclear whether 
individual components of the self are affected independently of each other or if the 
self as a whole is affected.  Moreover, it is not known how the self changes over the 
course of the disease.  Caddell and Clare recommend exploring how the sense of self 
in dementia relates to other variables in order to inform appropriate interventions for 
PWD. 
1.4.2 Models of the Self in Relation to Dementia 
Traditionally, medical approaches have largely been used to understand 
dementia.  These methods have primarily focused on neurological aspects of the 
disease (e.g., Hyman et al., 1984).  However, within the last couple of decades, 
dementia has been approached in a way that refers to the whole person (e.g., Hart & 
Semple, 1990).  Aminzadeh et al. (2007) argue that neurological deficits alone 
cannot fully explain the clinical manifestation of dementia, and that psychosocial 
factors largely influence the experience of dementia.  
Indeed, some conceptualisations of dementia emphasise the interaction 
between neurological impairment and social psychology as a vital factor in 
determining the level and manifestation of functional disability (Kitwood, 1997; 
Sabat, 2001).  These models stress the personhood of the individual with dementia, 
and therefore the centrality of identity, self-concept, and emotional experience 
(Clare, 2002).  
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1.4.2.1 Personhood model.  Kitwood (1990, 1996, 1997) has been 
influential in developing an alternative paradigm in which to understand dementia.  
He coined the term ‘personhood’ in relation to dementia to encompass an approach 
which takes the person into account and not just brain pathology.  He proposed a 
dialectical model of dementia, which reflects the importance of interactions between 
variables at the biological and psychosocial levels.  In his model of personhood, he 
described the key influence of social factors in how PWD live their lives.  He 
highlighted the importance of retaining intact relationships to enable the person with 
dementia to experience variety and enjoyment.  He suggested a cluster of needs in 
dementia, which are central to the maintenance of personhood.  These include: 
comfort (providing warmth, tenderness, the soothing of pain and sorrow, and the 
calming of anxiety); attachment (providing a bond in the face of uncertainties); 
inclusion (providing a distinct place in the shared life of a group); occupation (being 
involved in life in a way that is personally significant, and which draws on a 
person’s strengths and abilities); and identity (knowing who one is, both cognitively 
and emotionally, and having a sense of continuity with the past – a self-narrative). 
In contrast to these enriching interactions, Kitwood (1997) also outlined 
damaging interactions and processes, which he termed “malignant social 
psychology” (p. 45).  He believed that these “depersonalizing tendencies” (p. 46), 
may produce a devaluating environment and therefore threaten the well-being of 
PWD.  He described 17 of these tendencies that may be used by people in contact 
with the person with dementia: treachery, disempowerment, infantilisation, 
intimidation, labelling, stigmatization, outpacing, invalidation, banishment, 
objectification, ignoring, imposition, withholding, accusation, disruption, mockery, 
and disparagement. 
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1.4.2.2 Symbolic interactionism.  Some of Kitwood’s (1990, 1996, 1997) 
model is underpinned by ideas from the symbolic interactionist perspective (Manis 
& Meltzer, 1967). This perspective focuses upon the ways in which individuals, as 
active social agents, interpret situations, and shape their social worlds within social 
contexts (e.g., Hubbard, Cook, Tester, & Downs, 2002).  Early in the development of 
this approach, Mead (1934) elucidated the notion of the self as being based on social 
constructs, which are rooted in interactions with others.  He believed that the self is 
bound by language and interaction, and therefore can adopt various social roles.  He 
argued that role taking was the key process by which we come to develop a self-
concept (i.e., seeing ourselves from the standpoint of others).  This is consistent with 
Cooley’s (1902) theory of the looking-glass self, which is based on the tenet that the 
self is reflected in the reactions of other people, who are the ‘looking glass’ for 
oneself (cited in McIntyre, 2006). 
Several studies have employed a symbolic interactionist approach to 
investigate the self in dementia (Fontana & Smith, 1989; Hubbard et al., 2002; 
Saunders, 1998).  The findings of these studies are mixed.  Some have showed that 
the sense of self and identity are retained in PWD, based on the ability to give 
meaning to non-verbal behaviours (Hubbard et al., 2002), and the capacity to 
perform identity construction and maintenance in a variety of social interactions 
(Saunders, 1998).  However, another study indicated that PWD lost the ability to 
interpret other people’s actions, and define social situations, which the authors 
argued is suggestive of a loss of self (Fontana & Smith, 1989).   
1.4.2.3 Social constructionism.  Similar to symbolic interactionism 
perspectives, social constructionist approaches posit that language is central to the 
construction of identity (e.g., Shotter & Gergen, 1989).  Based on a social 
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constructionist model in relation to the self in dementia, Sabat and Collins (1999) 
have suggested that three types of self exist.  Self 1 is considered the self of personal 
identity, which can be evidenced through the use of personal pronouns (i.e., “I”, 
“me”, “mine”); Self 2 incorporates one’s beliefs and attributes, as displayed through 
verbal communication; and Self 3 consists of multiple social personae, which are 
exhibited during social interactions.  
Findings from studies using a social constructionist approach to understand 
the self in dementia consistently show that all three types of self outlined by Sabat 
and Collins (1999) persist into the later stages in dementia (e.g., Fazio & Mitchell, 
2009; Sabat & Harre, 1992; Sabat & Collins, 1999).  However, studies investigating 
the presence of Self 3 were based on case studies (Sabat, 2002; Sabat & Collins, 
1999), therefore the representativeness of these findings are questionable. 
1.4.3 Self-Discrepancy Theory (SDT)   
One area of the self that has yet to be addressed in the literature on dementia 
is SDT (Higgins, 1987).  SDT is based on the premise that self-inconsistencies 
produce emotional problems.  SDT specifically attempts to distinguish among the 
different types of emotional problems and how these relate to particular types of self-
discrepancies.   
SDT contends that individuals have self-guides (i.e., self-directive standards 
or acquired guides for being), which people are motivated to meet.  In SDT, 
therefore, the self is divided into three components: actual (the self-concept), and 
ideal and ought selves (self-guides).  The actual self refers to the attributes a person 
believes they actually possess, the ideal self relates to qualities a person would 
ideally like to have, and the ought self is made up of the attributes a person believes 
they should possess out of duty.  Although individuals may hold both actual and 
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ought self-guides, Higgins (1987) acknowledged that some people may only possess 
one.   
The theory posits that when discrepancies between the three domains occur, 
people experience emotional distress.  Specifically, Higgins (1987) argued that 
actual/ideal self-discrepancy (hereafter referred to as AI self-discrepancy) is 
associated with dejection-related emotions, such as depressive disorders, while 
actual/ought self-discrepancy (hereafter referred to as AO self-discrepancy) is linked 
with agitation-related emotions, such as anxiety disorders.  Support for these 
distinctions has been found in several studies (e.g., Higgins, 1987; Strauman, 1990). 
1.4.3.1 Self-discrepancies in different populations.  Self-discrepancies 
have been studied in an array of different populations, including undergraduate 
students (e.g., Bruch, Rivet, & Laurenti, 2000), adolescents (e.g., Papadakis, Prince, 
Jones, & Strauman, 2006), adults with social phobia and dysthymia (e.g., Weilage & 
Hope, 1999), adults with a physical illness (e.g., Waters, Keefe, & Strauman, 2004), 
adults with a TBI (e.g., Cantor et al., 2005), and older adults (e.g., Francis, Boldero, 
& Newson, 2002; Heidrich & Powwattana, 2004).  In Francis et al. (2002) study they 
found that depression was not predicted by AI self-discrepancies but that current 
anxiety was predicted by AO self-discrepancies as reported retrospectively for the 
ages of 20 and 40.  Other research (e.g., Heidrich & Powwattana, 2004) showed that 
higher levels of depression and anxiety were associated with greater self-
discrepancies, and poorer physical and mental health was related to AI self-
discrepancies.  
A review of the evidence applying SDT to the understanding of affective 
disorders was conducted by Arena (2008).  The findings of this review indicate that 
the proposed links in the theory between the specific self-discrepancies (i.e., AI and 
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AO self-discrepancies) and corresponding emotional disorders (i.e., depression and 
anxiety) is contentious and likely to be more diffuse.  Indeed, some evidence has 
been found supporting the association between particular self-discrepancies and 
specific types of emotional distress (e.g., Scott & O’Hara, 1993; Strauman, 1992).  
However, it was noted by Arena (2008) that these studies had methodological flaws 
and were based on undergraduate students in the United States, thereby making 
generalisability difficult to clinical samples and the UK population.  Other studies 
have found no connection between the specific distinctions of self-discrepancies and 
particular kinds of emotional distress, but between AI and AO self-discrepancies and 
negative affect in general (e.g., Ozgul, Heubeck, Ward, & Wilkinson, 2003; 
Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert, & Barlow, 1998). 
1.4.4 Summary  
The study of the self in dementia has only received attention in the literature in 
the past couple of decades.  The findings of these studies are disparate, although 
overall, most have found that the self is preserved throughout the course of the 
disease to some degree, but that it is also compromised in some way.  Several 
models of the self exist to explain the role of the self in dementia, although one 
theory of the self that has yet to be explored in relation to dementia is SDT.  The 
next section will outline the definition of AM and its relationship to the self, 
followed by an exploration of the role of AM in dementia.  
1.5 Autobiographical Memory and Dementia 
1.5.1 Definition of Autobiographical Memory  
AM is defined as a person’s life story based on the collected recalled events 
in their life (Birren & Schroots, 2006).  AM is made up of two components – 
personal episodic memory and personal semantic memory (e.g., Baddeley, 1992; 
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Dritschel, Williams, Baddeley, & Nimmo-Smith, 1992).  The former involves 
memory for specific personal events (e.g., marriages or births), while the latter 
consists of personal facts that are not event-based (e.g., names of friends and family, 
or facts about where one was born).   
According to Tulving (1983, 1985), memory can be understood in a 
hierarchical structure in relation to consciousness (see Figure 1).  He proposed that 
procedural memory is concerned with the way things are done (e.g., skill 
acquisition), while semantic memory refers to symbolically representable knowledge 
(e.g., facts about one’s life).  He further postulated that episodic memory is used to 
mediate the remembering of personally experienced events.  He argued that episodic 
memory could not function without both semantic memory and procedural memory.  
He also posited that each of these three memory systems were characterised by a 
different kind of consciousness – anoetic (implicit, not knowing), noetic (explicit, 
knowing), and autonoetic (explicit, self-knowing).  He asserted that the essence of 
episodic memory is based on the combination of three concepts – the self, autonoetic 
awareness (self-knowing), and subjectively sensed time (Tulving, 2002).  It is 
autonoetic consciousness which he believed “…confers the special phenomenal 
flavour to the remembering of past events” (Tulving, 1985, p. 3).    
Similarly, Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) propose that AM is stored 
hierarchically in terms of different levels of specificity, including general events 
(e.g., “holidays with X”), or specific events (e.g., “the day I married X”).  Given the 
overlap between AM and episodic memory, the terms will be used interchangeably 
throughout this thesis. 
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Figure 1.  Hierarchical structure of memory according to Tulving (1983, 1985)  
   Adapted from Shinosaki, Nishikawa, and Takeda (2000) 
1.5.2 Functions of Autobiographical Memory 
According to Bluck, Alea, Habermas, and Rubin (2005), AM serves three 
broad functions – directive, self and social.  They postulate that the directive 
function involves using the past to guide present and future thought and behaviour.  
For example, Baddeley (1987) proposes that AM enables access to old information 
in order to help solve problems in the present and predict future events. The self 
function of AM is believed to provide continuity for the sense of self (e.g., Bluck & 
Levine, 1998), and is particularly important when the self is in adverse conditions 
that necessitate self-change (Robinson, 1986). Preservation of the self-concept 
(Wilson & Ross, 2003) is considered as a useful means of self-regulation across 
adulthood (Cohen, 1998).  Finally, it has been proposed that the role of AM enables 
the development and maintenance of social bonds (e.g., Pillemer, 1998) and the 
provision of material for conversation needed to facilitate social interactions (Cohen, 
1998). 
1.5.3 Models of Autobiographical Memory and the Self   
1.5.3.1 The reminiscence bump phenomenon.  Several researchers have 
emphasised the link between AM and the self in relation to the reminiscence bump 
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phenomenon (also known as the lifespan retrieval curve) (e.g., Rathbone, Moulin, & 
Conway, 2008).  The reminiscence bump consists of a period of increased 
remembering covering the ages of 10 to 30 years of age (e.g., Fitzgerald & 
Lawrence, 1984; Franklin & Holding, 1977) and is usually observed in people aged 
about 35 or older (e.g., Rubin, Wetzler, & Nebes, 1986).  It has been proposed that 
identity emerges during late adolescence and early adulthood (Erikson, 1950), 
therefore potentially leading to self-defining experiences during these life stages 
(Singer & Salovey, 1993).  Some authors have gone on to argue that as events from 
this period are linked with the formation of the self, this makes them highly 
accessible (e.g., Conway, 1997; Fitzgerald, 1988) and resistant to disruptions in AM 
(Conway & Haque, 1999).  Associations between the reminiscence bump and the 
self has been found in numerous studies (e.g., Schrauf & Rubin, 2001; Janssen, 
Chessa, & Murre, 2007; Cappeliez, 2008).  
1.5.3.2 The self memory system (SMS).  The importance of AM in relation 
to the self has further been expanded on by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), who 
developed a conceptual framework called the SMS.  They posit that the retrieval of 
specific information about one’s personal past is influenced by constructions of the 
self, including goals, expectations, and self-image.    The SMS consists of two parts 
– the working self and the autobiographical knowledge base.  The working self is a 
complex goal hierarchy, which operates numerous control processes that initiate and 
monitor goal-directed activity (Williams et al., 2007).  The aim of the goal hierarchy 
is to reduce discrepancies between desired goal states and the current state, thereby 
regulating behaviour (Conway, 2005).  The autobiographical knowledge base is a 
hierarchical retrieval process, which includes three levels of representation.  These 
include stages of life that occur over a prolonged period of time (lifetime periods), 
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repeated events that happen over months, weeks, or days (general events) and single 
or specific events that occur in a given moment in time (event specific knowledge) 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).   
In this system, it is proposed that a bi-directional relationship between the 
sense of self and AM exists, in that the goal structure of the working self serves to 
activate autobiographical remembering and autobiographical memories function to 
develop, express and maintain the self (Wang & Conway, 2004).  Subsequently, 
autobiographical knowledge grounds the self (Conway & Tacchi, 1996) and allows 
for the continuity and extension of one’s identity over time by enabling the 
integration of past and present selves (Addis & Tippett, 2004).  Indeed, Baddeley 
(1992) argued that the degree to which previous information about the self, and the 
extent to which new information is incorporated into a revised sense of self, is likely 
to be influenced by changes in AM.  Conway (2005) further expands on this stating 
that “…memory and central aspects of the self form a coherent system in which, in 
the healthy individual, beliefs about, and knowledge of, the self are confirmed and 
supported by memories of specific experiences” (p.595). 
The relationship between the self and memory as proposed by the SMS has 
been illustrated in several studies (for a review see Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004). 
1.5.3.3 Narrative identity models.  Similarly, McAdams (1996) proposed 
that identity is a life story – an integration of past, present, and anticipated future.  It 
is believed that for an individual to experience a sense of identity, they must have a 
coherent life story (i.e., a narrative identity), which is woven together from 
meaningful autobiographical memories (Sutin & Robins, 2005).  Romero and Wenz 
(2001) further argue that the self is a cognitive schema, which encodes, processes, 
and maintains information about the person and the environment. 
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In line with this view, Singer and Blagov (2004) have also highlighted the 
role of integrative memories in the maintenance of the self.  Singer and Blagov 
(2000-2001) conceptualise integrative memories as narratives in which individuals 
ascribe meaning to their memories by relating them to lessons about the self, 
important relationships, or life in general.  By virtue, therefore, they are 
autobiographical memories which have been integrated in the self-system.  They 
further proposed that the meaning-making process in the construction of these self-
defining memories enables memory to influence the self (Singer & Blagov, 2004).  
For example, linked with the SMS (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), they argue 
that linking memories to abstract self-knowledge via meaning making gives extra 
cognitive, affective and motivational value to memories and therefore powerfully 
reinforces relevant goals.   
1.5.4 Autobiographical Memory Impairments in Dementia  
According to Graham, Emery, and Hodges (2004), many cognitive domains 
are impaired in AD and VaD, including episodic memory, semantic memory, 
executive/attentional functioning, and visuospatial skills.  However, episodic 
memory is believed to be the most vulnerable in dementia, and is often impaired 
from the early stages (Shinosaki et al., 2000).  Some studies have indicated that AM 
is more severely impaired in AD compared to VaD (Kertesz & Clydesdale, 1994), 
while others have found no difference (Almkvist, Bäckman, Basun, & Wahlund, 
1993).  Numerous studies have found AM to be impaired from the early stages of 
AD, with more impairment of recent memories, relative to remotely acquired 
autobiographical memories (e.g., Addis & Tippett, 2004; Graham & Hodges, 1997; 
Kopelman, 1989).  These studies specifically revealed impairments in both personal 
episodic memory and personal semantic memory.  Similar results were shown in a 
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recent study using a sample of people with VaD, AD and mixed dementias (Naylor 
& Clare, 2008).  MTA found in dementia has also been associated with these AM 
impairments (Guela, 1998).  
It has been argued that a loss of self in dementia occurs through the 
deterioration of memory and increasing difficulties in communicating (Cohen-
Mansfield et al., 2006).  This is consistent with several studies which have found that 
in relation to controls, the greatest impairment in memories of people with AD were 
from the reminiscence bump timeframe (Fromholt & Larsen, 1991), which as stated 
above is a crucial period for the formation and maintenance of a stable self (e.g., 
Conway, 1997; Fitzgerald, 1988).   
The impact of cognitive deficits on the sense of self in PWD is well 
encapsulated in a diary of a dementia sufferer (Cohen & Eisdorfer, 1986, p. 22): 
No theory of medicine can explain what is happening to me.  Every few 
months I sense that another piece of me is missing.  My life. . .my self. . .are 
falling apart.  I can only think half thoughts now.  Someday I may wake up 
and not think at all, not know who I am.  Most people expect to die someday, 
but whoever expected to lose their self first. 
This experience of a disintegrating self may be based on the AM impairments 
described above.  For example, Basting (2003) posits that the self is based on a 
continuum of memory and creativity that exists in a social context.  Therefore, if an 
individual is suffering from memory loss, she argues that they may suffer a gradual 
depletion of personal control over their identity, although not necessarily a total loss 
of self.  In view of the proposed link between AM and the sense of self, several 
studies have focused on AM and the self and identity in dementia (Addis & Tippett, 
2004; Naylor & Clare, 2008; Jetten, et al., 2010; Fargeau et al., 2010).  All of these 
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studies, except from Naylor and Clare (2008) found an association between AM 
deficits and impairments in the self and identity in PWD.  These studies will be 
discussed further in section 1.6.2. 
1.5.5 Autobiographical Memory Impairments and Psychopathology  
Deficits in AM often include the retrieval of overgeneral memories (OGM) 
(i.e., categories of events) rather than specific memories.  This phenomenon, first 
identified by Williams and Broadbent (1986) in relation to depression, involves the 
inability to negotiate the upper levels of the memory hierarchy, which is necessary 
for the required level of specificity when trying to recall specific events (e.g., 
episodic memories).  This deficit has been found in AD when compared to age-
matched, healthy controls (Moses, Culpin, Lowe, & McWilliam, 2004).  These 
findings suggest that people with AD may lack the cognitive ability to engage in an 
effective and directed search for a specific memory.   
OGM has been associated with numerous affective disorders, particularly 
depression (for a review see Williams et al., 2007).  It is therefore hypothesised that 
PWD will have problems of OGM and thus experience depression.  
 In light of findings that suggest OGM in dementia (Moses et al., 2004), and 
the bi-directional relationship between the sense of self and AM (Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), it is conceivable that PWD who experience this phenomenon 
may also experience a change in the sense of self.  Indeed, recently, Williams et al. 
(2007) hypothesised that the SMS model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) may 
account for OGM due to a dysfacilitation of the retrieval process (i.e., a search for a 
specific event stops prematurely at the general description stage rather than moving 
on to event-specific knowledge).   
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Other AM impairments, such as autobiographical fluency (e.g., the ability to 
describe autobiographical memories) have also been associated with a loss of 
identity in PWD (e.g., Addis & Tippett, 2004).  It may therefore be feasible that 
deficits in AM and the self, given their adverse impact on PWD (e.g., Cohen & 
Eisdorfer, 1986), will also lead to emotional distress in this population.  In line with 
this assumption, Jetten et al., (2010) found that AM impairments were associated 
with a negative impact on well-being, which was mediated by identity loss.   
Moreover, it has been proposed that the creation of meaning from memory 
(i.e., integrative memories [Singer & Blagov, 2000]) assists affect regulation 
(Robinson, 1986).  Blagov and Singer (2004) assert that the ability to learn from 
experience and to incorporate these life lessons into ongoing self-knowledge is a 
prime goal in psychotherapy, and therefore argue that the capacity to produce 
integrative memories is crucial to well-being.  They also suggest that meaning 
making and the construction of integrative self-defining memories are strategies that 
help people to cope with negative emotions and should be associated with optimal 
levels of adjustment.  Indeed, such a skill has been associated with positive self-
regard in college students (Debats, Drost, & Hansen, 1995) and with well-being in 
parents of disabled children (King, Scollon, Ramsey, & May, 2000).  Blagov and 
Singer (2004) also found a relationship between deficits in integrative memories and 
adjustment issues  in college students.  Similarly, Bauer, McAdams, and Pals (2008) 
propose that “narrative identity provides life with unity, purpose and meaning” (p. 
82), which they argue is linked to increased well-being.  They assert that growth 
stories (i.e., personal narratives that incorporate one’s developmental processes) are 
conducive to well-being.  For example, in developmental theories, Rogers (1961) 
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suggests that when a person is fully functioning they strive to gain a deeper 
understanding of their inner life. 
Blagov and Singer (2004) further argue that attaching a moral or lesson to a 
memory is a separate cognitive process in addition to general life reflection (e.g., 
Staudinger, 2001).  Therefore, it is conceivable that meaning-making from memories 
may require more advanced and additional cognitive abilities which, on top of an 
already deteriorating cognitive system, may be difficult for PWD.  As such, it is 
plausible that impairments in integrative memories will be evident in PWD, given 
the deficiencies in AM and the self that have been found (e.g., Addis & Tippett, 
2004).  Furthermore, as deficits in the recall of integrative memories have been 
linked to adjustment difficulties (Blagov & Singer, 2004), it may be hypothesised 
that PWD will experience a deficit in the recall of integrative memories and 
therefore experience emotional distress. 
1.5.6 Summary  
AM appears to play an important directive, social and self function.  
Specifically, AM has been shown to play a crucial role in the formation of the self, 
and vice versa.  Deficits in AM, such as OGM and impaired recall of integrative 
memories have been associated with depression and adjustment problems.  AM 
deficits have been found early in the course of AD and VaD, including OGM, which 
may lead to depression, as well as produce changes in the sense of self in PWD.   
Despite the unique relationship between the self and AM being well-
established, these relationships have seemingly yet to be explored in much detail in 
the literature on PWD.  Few studies have also examined the emotional impact of 
dementia from the perspective of the person with the condition.  In the next section, 
a description of the search strategy used to assess the existing literature examining 
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the self, AM, emotional distress and dementia is outlined.  The existing research will 
then be discussed and critiqued.   
1.6 Search Strategy of Relevant Literature 
 A systematic review of the literature was undertaken between December 
2009 and May 2011 to ascertain what the research findings were linking dementia, 
AM, components of the self, and emotional distress.  Computerised databases, 
including PsycINFO, MEDLINE, EMBASE, AMED and CINAHL were searched 
using the terms Alzheimer*, dementia, self, identity, selfhood, personhood, 
“autobiographic* memor*”, “episodic memor*” and “emotional distress”, distress, 
anxiety*, depression, depressive*, and dysphoria.  Truncation (*) was used where 
necessary to ensure that different combinations of words were obtained.  These terms 
were all combined and yielded no results.  In order to broaden the search, all terms 
related to emotional distress were then removed and the searches completed again.  
On this second occasion, 56 studies were found. Abstracts of all articles were 
assessed for suitability and reference lists of relevant articles were searched to 
identify any additional appropriate studies. 
1.6.1 Inclusion and Exclusion criteria 
In order to reduce search bias, articles from all years were searched. Articles 
were included if they: 
 were written in English 
 examined a specific aspect of the self, identity, selfhood or personhood 
 investigated AM or episodic memory 
 used participants who had a diagnosis of AD, VaD or mixed dementia  
 were from peer-reviewed journals  
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Non-empirical studies, book chapters, reviews, dissertation abstracts, 
erratums and case studies were excluded.  In total, four studies met the inclusion 
criteria (see Table 1).  These studies will be examined in the next section of this 
chapter. 
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Reference Design Sample Measures Main findings 
Fargeau et al. 
(2010) 
Correlational 47 French participants 
with mild to moderate 
AD 
MMSE (cognitive functioning) 
AES (apathy) 
GADS (depression) 
AM was measured by a scale 
devised by Piolino (2003)  
The self was measured by a 
scale based on the concepts of 
James (1890) (cited in Fargeau 
et al., 2010) 
 91.5% of participants had impairment in at least one 
dimension of the self. 
 23.1% of participants showed deficits in all three self-
dimensions. 
 Severity of impairment was predicted by deficits in semantic 
fluency, apathy and age. 
 Longer duration of illness was related to more impairment in 
the self. 
 No significant correlations were found between impairments 
in the self, depression and episodic fluency. 
Naylor & Clare 
(2008) 
Correlational 30 participants with 
mild dementia (n = 20 
with AD, n = 2 with 
VaD and n = 8 with 
AD and VaD) 
MMSE  
AMI (semantic and episodic 
memory) 
TSCS-II (identity) 
MARS (awareness of memory 
functioning) 
 
 Lower levels of awareness of memory functioning were 
associated with poorer AM recall from the mid-life point but 
with a more positive and definite sense of identity. 
 No significant relationship was found between impairment in 
AM and loss of identity. 
Addis & Tippett 
(2004) 
Group 
comparison  
20 participants with 
mild to moderate AD 
20 healthy, age-
matched controls 
MMSE 
AMI 
TST (strength, quality and 
complexity of identity) 
TSCS-II 
Autobiographical Fluency 
Task (Dritschel et al., 1992) 
(AM fluency) 
 AD group had significantly poorer identity (strength, quality 
and direction) than controls. 
 Deficits in recall of childhood autobiographical incidents were 
significantly correlated with more abstract responses about 
identity. 
 Impairments in childhood and early adulthood personal 
semantic memory were significantly associated with more 
definite identity responses. 
 Deficits in autobiographical fluency for childhood events and 
early adulthood names were significantly correlated with a 
weaker identity. 
Table 1 
Studies Investigating the Relationship between Autobiographical Memory and the Self and Identity in Dementia  
3
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Note. AD = Alzheimer’s disease; VaD = vascular dementia; AM = Autobiographical memory; MMSE = Mini Mental State Examination (Folstein et al., 1992); AES = 
Apathy Evaluation Scale (Marin, Biedrzycki, & Firinciogullarti, 1991); GADS = Goldberg Depression and Anxiety Scale (Goldberg, Bridges, Duncan-Jones, & Grayson, 
1988); AMI = Autobiographical Memory Index (Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1990); TSCS-II  = Tennessee Self-Concept Scale – Second Edition (Fitts & Warren, 1996); 
MARS = Memory Awareness Rating Scale (Clare, Wilson, Carter, Roth, & Hodges, 2002); TST = Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954); ACE-R = 
Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination – Revised (Mioshi et al., 2006); QOL-AD = The Quality of Life in Alzheimer’s Disease (Logsdon, Gibbons. McCurry, & Terry, 
1999).  
Jetten et al. 
(2010) 
Group 
comparison 
15 participants with 
mild dementia 
16 participants with 
severe dementia 
(special dementia care 
unit) 
17 community, age-
matched controls 
ACE-R (cognitive functioning) 
AMI  
QOL-AD (life satisfaction) 
Personal and social identity 
was measured by scales 
devised by Campbell et al. 
(1996) and Haslam et al. 
(2008), respectively 
 
 AM deficits were significantly correlated with reduced 
cognitive ability, a loss of personal identity and a reduction in 
membership of multiple social groups. 
 AM impairments were significantly associated with less life 
satisfaction, which was mediated by a loss of personal identity 
strength but not cognitive ability. 
 Life satisfaction was significantly poorer for people with mild 
dementia than community controls. 
3
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1.6.2 Examination of the Extant Literature 
In line with the SMS (Conway & Playdell-Pearce, 2000), several studies have 
explored the link between the self, identity and AM in PWD.  Addis and Tippett 
(2004) investigated AM impairment and changes in identity in 20 people with mild 
to moderate AD and a control group of 20 healthy age-matched controls.  They 
found that the AD group had a significantly poorer identity than controls in terms of 
strength (fewer identity statements), quality (more abstract and vague responses, and 
fewer definite identity responses), and direction (lower total identity scores, and thus 
a less positive identity).  Poor quality of identity (i.e., more abstract responses) was 
also significantly associated with impairments in recall for childhood 
autobiographical incidents.  Additionally, impairments in autobiographical fluency 
for childhood events and early adulthood names were significantly associated with a 
weaker identity, indicating that less fluent descriptions when recalling childhood 
autobiographical events and early adulthood names are detrimental to a strong sense 
of identity.   
These findings are consistent with the reminiscence bump phenomenon (e.g., 
Rathbone, Moulin, & Conway, 2008), which proposes that autobiographical 
memories from ages 10-30 are closely linked with identity (e.g., Fitzgerald, 1988).  
Deficits in the usually highly accessible memories from the “bump” period may 
therefore weaken the sense of identity in PWD.  In line with this view are the 
findings of Fromholt and colleagues who tested the reminiscence bump in people 
with AD and revealed that the largest decrease in memories in relation to controls 
was from the “bump” period (Fromholt & Larsen, 1991; Fromholt, Larsen, & 
Larsen, 1995).    
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However, the study by Addis and Tippett (2004) also found that deficits in 
childhood and early adulthood personal semantic memory were significantly 
correlated with a higher quality of identity in a different sense (i.e., more definite 
identity responses).  This may suggest that deficits in episodic memory are more 
damaging than impairments in semantic memory in the maintenance of identity in 
PWD, although this finding should be treated with caution due to the issues in 
measuring the self and identity in PWD. 
Similar unexpected results were apparent in a study by Naylor and Clare 
(2008), who examined the relationship between AM, identity and awareness in 30 
people with mild AD, VaD and mixed AD and VaD.  They found that less awareness 
of memory functioning was associated with poorer AM recall from the mid-life 
point, but with a more positive and definite sense of identity.  Additionally, they 
found no significant relationship between AM deficits and loss of identity.   
These unforeseen findings and some of those of Addis and Tippett (2004) are 
inconsistent with the SMS (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), in which it is argued 
that autobiographical remembering is supported by the sense of self and vice versa.  
However, as already noted, the inherent difficulties in measuring the self and 
identity, particularly in PWD, where modifications are necessary, may compromise 
finding the theoretical links proposed in the SMS.  Indeed, the identity measures 
used in the studies by Addis and Tippet (2004) and Naylor and Clare (2008) have not 
been validated on PWD.  Moreover, some participants in Addis and Tippett’s (2004) 
study were recruited from care facilities, which may confound some of the findings, 
especially in light of evidence that care level may act as an indicator of AM decline 
(e.g., Jetten et al., 2010). 
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The findings from Naylor and Clare’s (2008) study are interesting as they 
indicate that identity is preserved even when awareness of memory functioning is 
limited.  They postulate that this may occur for several reasons.  First, they argue that 
the personal database (PDB), which is necessary for the storage of events containing 
episodes of success and failure on tasks (based on memories in episodic memory) 
(Morris & Hannesdottir, 2004), may not have been updated.  They hypothesise that 
this may support the belief in PWD that functioning remains at the same level as 
prior to experiencing dementia.  As such, they suggest that individuals will not be 
primed to integrate changes into their sense of identity and will therefore feel a more 
definite sense of identity.  Second, they propose that PWD may be using 
psychological defence mechanisms, which are aimed to protect the self from the 
psychological distress that is linked with failure.   
Extending on these studies, several authors have more recently attempted to 
investigate the relationships between the self and identity, AM, and well-being in 
PWD.  Fargeau et al. (2010) aimed to examine changes in the self in people with AD 
in relation to behaviour and memory, specifically executive functioning, apathy, 
depression, and AM.  They recruited 47 French participants with mild to moderate 
AD.   
Results showed that 91.5% of participants presented with impairment in at 
least one dimension of the self, and 23.1% of participants showed impairment in all 
three self-dimensions.  The severity of impairment in the self was found to be 
predicted by deficits in semantic fluency, apathy and age.  A longer duration of 
illness was also related to greater impairment in the self.  However, when exploring 
the relationships between impairments in the self, depression, and episodic fluency, 
no significant results were found.   These findings indicate partial support for the 
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SMS (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), in that deficits in the self were associated 
with impairments in semantic fluency, but not episodic fluency.  These findings are 
somewhat contradictory to those of Addis and Tippet (2004) who found that a more 
definite sense of identity was linked to deficits in semantic memory.  Nevertheless, 
these results are difficult to interpret due to the differences in AM and self and 
identity measures used across the different studies.  Indeed, it is probable that 
different elements of the self and identity were being measured.  The findings of 
Fargeau et al. (2010) also imply that mood is not a key factor in relation to the self 
and AM in PWD.  
However, the findings of this study should be treated with caution due to 
several methodological limitations.  First, the authors use an unstandardised scale to 
measure AM (Piolino, 2003) and do not describe how participants’ answers were 
recorded or coded, making it difficult to replicate the findings.  Second, there is no 
report of whether these answers were coded by independent raters, therefore 
researcher bias cannot be ruled out.  Third, using caregivers responses to measure 
impairments in the self is problematic as is does not take the experience of the 
person with dementia into account, and thus lacks ecological validity.  Fourth, the 
study was conducted with French participants, making it difficult to generalise the 
results to a UK population of PWD.    
Jetten et al. (2010) also recently explored the impact of AM deficits and 
identity loss on the well-being in people with mild to severe dementia and age-
matched controls.  They found that AM loss was significantly associated with 
reduced cognitive ability and with a loss of personal identity strength and a reduction 
in membership of multiple social groups.  Impaired AM was also significantly 
associated with less life satisfaction, which was mediated by a loss of personal 
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identity strength but not cognitive ability.  Life satisfaction was significantly poorer 
for people with mild dementia than community controls.  
Unlike the findings of Fargeau et al. (2010), the results of this study suggest 
that loss of identity is not only a negative consequence of AM deficits but is also 
critical in predicting well-being in PWD.  This is consistent with narrative identity 
models (e.g., Singer & Blagov, 2004; Bauer et al., 2008), which propose that identity 
and the meaning that this provides for individuals in their lives is important for well-
being.   The findings also lend support to the SMS (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000), in that deterioration in AM corresponded with loss of identity.  Nevertheless, 
although the results of this study are interesting, the findings should be treated with 
caution.  For example, the reliability and validity of some measures used in this 
study are questionable as non-standardised measures were used to assess identity and 
limited psychometric data was reported for these scales.  Moreover, the type of 
dementia is not documented, which limits the ability to draw comparisons with other 
studies. 
1.6.3 Critique of the Evidence 
 This section includes a discussion of the overall findings of the studies, and 
an evaluation of the methodological issues in relation to the measures used, data 
collection, and participants used.  
1.6.3.1 Overall findings.  The findings of the four studies are mixed, which 
may in part be attributable to the different aspects of self and identity that were being 
investigated, as well as the small sample sizes used.  All studies found that some 
deficits in AM were associated with impairments in some aspects of the self and 
identity, with the exception of Naylor and Clare (2008), who found the opposite (i.e., 
poorer AM was related to a more positive and definite sense of identity).  Similarly, 
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Addis and Tippett (2004) also revealed that deficits in childhood and early adulthood 
personal semantic memory were significantly correlated with more definite identity 
responses, although they also found that some deficits in AM were related to a 
weaker identity.  Jetten et al. (2010) found that impairments in AM were 
significantly associated with less life satisfaction, which was mediated by a loss of 
personal identity strength.  These results suggest that loss of identity not only has a 
negative effect  on memory but  is also critical in its effects on QOL.  However, 
Fargeau et al. (2010) found no significant results between the self and depression 
scores, indicating that in their sample depression was not a factor in the impairment 
of the self and AM. 
 1.6.3.2 Methodological issues.  The findings in the current literature 
examining the self or identity and AM must be considered in light of the 
methodological flaws evident in most studies.  For example, one difficulty apparent 
in assessing the findings of the studies is the different ways in which the self or 
identity were measured.  In two studies (Addis & Tippett, 2004; Naylor & Clare, 
2008), the TCSC-II was used to measure identity strength, direction, and quality.  
This measure has good psychometric properties; however, it is a measure of self-
concept, and not specifically a measure of identity.  Given that the two studies which 
employed the TCSC-II only used some parts of the TSCS-II to score identity, it is 
possible that the content validity of the measure was compromised.  Moreover, the 
TCSC-II is not validated for use in dementia populations.  It was also noted by 
certain authors (Naylor & Clare, 2008) that some participants found the task too 
demanding.  Several studies also used non-standardised measures of self and identity 
(Fargeau et al., 2010; Jetten et al., 2010), or adapted measures (Addis & Tippett, 
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2004), therefore making it difficult to determine the reliability and validity of the 
measures, as well as presenting a challenge to the comparability of findings.   
Overall, AM was measured using the AMI, except for the studies by Fargeau 
et al. (2010), who used a scale by Piolino (2003), and Addis and Tippett (2004), who 
employed the Autobiographical Fluency task (Dritschel et al., 1992) in addition to 
the AMI.  No psychometric properties were reported for either of these measures, 
therefore reliability and validity cannot be determined.  The AMI is an appropriate 
and standardised measure to study AM, and has been widely used and validated.  
However, it is recognised that the AMI does not assess the period between early 
adulthood and recent life (Graham & Hodges, 1997), which may be important when 
investigating participants who are in the older age range (Naylor & Clare, 2008).  
The latter authors attempted to rectify this in their study by adding a section in for 
mid-life, however, they concede that this is a non-standardised part of the measure, 
and therefore firm conclusions about their findings in relation to this section cannot 
be drawn.  It has also been acknowledged that when assessing AM in relation to the 
self, the AMI may not tap into the types of memories central to the formation and 
maintenance of the self (Caddell & Clare, 2010).  Several studies also did not report 
the coding process for some of the measures they used (Fargeau et al., 2010; Jetten et 
al., 2010), or whether independent raters were used to code a proportion of the 
responses given.  This means that inter-rater reliability cannot be established for 
these measures, and therefore researcher bias cannot be discounted.  
Overall, the studies in this review used relatively small sample sizes and are 
therefore susceptible to Type I and II errors.  Furthermore, small numbers of 
participants can limit firm conclusions being drawn from the data gathered, and 
therefore reduce external validity.  The only study that reported a power analysis in 
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relation to the sample size required was Naylor and Clare (2008), who, despite a 
small sample size of 30, reported that they had sufficient power to detect significant 
effects. 
The reporting of demographic variables for the samples was fairly poor 
across the four studies.  No studies documented the ethnicity of participants, and 
only two (Addis & Tippett, 2004; Fargeau et al., 2010) reported the education level 
of participants, which is problematic when attempting to compare studies.  The latter 
two studies were also conducted outside of the UK, making it difficult to generalise 
the findings to a UK population.  Nevertheless, a strength of the Fargeau et al. (2010) 
study was that it measured illness duration, enabling a correlation between this and 
the self to be made.  One study (Jetten et al., 2010) did not report the range of scores 
on the ACE-R, and another (Fargeau et al., 2010) failed to document a mean score 
on the MMSE.  These flaws present a challenge when trying to compare the results 
from the studies and cause difficulty in determining the generalisability of the 
findings. 
Another difficulty evident in comparing the results between studies is based 
on the variety of groups of PWD that were recruited.  For example, one study did not 
report the type of dementia diagnosed and recruited people from care homes in the 
mild to severe stages of dementia (Jetten et al., 2010).  Fargeau et al. (2010) also 
recruited people in the mild to severe stages from a Neurology Department, but only 
used participants with AD, although they did not state if participants were living in 
the community or care homes.  Addis and Tippett (2004) only used participants with 
AD, but their sample was made up of people in the mild to moderate stages of 
dementia and some were recruited from care homes and others from the community.  
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Only Naylor and Clare (2008) recruited people in the milder stages of dementia from 
the community, although they used people with AD, VaD, and mixed dementia. 
1.6.4 Summary  
The overall findings of the review suggest that the association between the 
self or identity and AM is equivocal.  This may, in part, be due to the methodological 
flaws apparent in the literature.  Indeed, the quality of the current literature is 
confounded by a lack of consistency in the measurement of the self or identity and 
AM.  This is further exacerbated by the use of unstandardised or adapted measures.  
The studies were also based on a variety of concepts in relation to the self or identity.  
While this may be a strength of the current literature as it considers the self or 
identity from various standpoints, it also limits any firm conclusions from being 
drawn about the nature of the self or identity in dementia, and is also problematic for 
comparing findings.  The use of relatively small sample sizes also limits the extent to 
which these findings can be generalised to the wider population of PWD, while the 
use of heterogeneous groups of participants in several studies makes delineation of 
findings difficult.  The next section will outline the rationale for the study, along 
with the aims of the current study.  Research questions and hypotheses for the 
present study are also presented. 
1.7 Rationale for the Study 
The results of this literature review indicate that, to date, no studies have 
explored self-discrepancies and emotional distress in PWD.  One study has examined 
the relationship between components of the self, AM and depression (Fargeau et al., 
2010), although this study had methodological flaws, was conducted outside of the 
UK, and did not measure the self from the perspective of the person with dementia.  
Additionally, while Jetten et al. (2010) investigated the relationships between life 
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satisfaction, identity and AM in PWD, they did not specifically measure emotional 
distress. 
In line with Higgins’ (1987) SDT, it is hypothesised that both AI  and AO 
self-discrepancies will occur in individuals with dementia resulting in emotional 
distress for the following reasons.  First, in view of the relationship between AM and 
the self (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and given that AM is impaired in 
AD and vascular dementia (e.g., Graham & Hodges, 1997), it is argued that the sense 
of self will be altered in dementia, resulting in self-discrepancy between the actual-
ideal and actual-ought selves.  Moreover, in view of the role of AM in developing, 
expressing and maintaining the self (e.g., Bluck et al., 2005), deficits in AM are 
likely to challenge and alter the sense of self.    
Second, the changes and impairments that PWD experience in respect of their 
functioning, as well as receiving and adjusting to a diagnosis of dementia, are likely 
to affect aspects of their self and identity as shown in the existing literature outlined 
above.  This may therefore cause conflict for PWD between their actual self and who 
they would ideally like to be, and who they feel they should be in the absence of the 
debilitating effects of dementia.  This is in line with the findings of Clare (2000), 
which showed that PWD experience tension between their prior and current self-
concept.  Additionally, in view of the relationship between certain illness 
representations (e.g., a strong illness identity and beliefs about uncontrollability of 
one’s illness) and emotional distress (e.g., Vaughan et al., 2003; Clare et al., 2006), 
and the negative emotional consequences described by PWD about their disease 
(e.g., Cohen & Eisdorfer, 1986; Clare et al., 2006), it is plausible that PWD may 
define their current self-concept in terms of the effects of dementia, and therefore 
experience emotional distress.   
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The association between memory deficits, specifically AM impairments (e.g., 
OGM and deficiencies in the recall of integrative memories) and emotional 
distress/adjustment difficulties have also all been linked (e.g., Moses et al., 2004; 
Singer & Blagov, 2004b).  Thus, in view of the AM impairments already found in 
dementia (e.g., Graham & Hodges, 1997) and their association with a loss of self and 
identity (e.g., Addis & Tippett, 2004), it is conceivable that deficits in AM will not 
only be associated with changes in the self, but also result in emotional distress for 
PWD.   
Most studies exploring the relationship between AM and the self in dementia 
have typically measured AM using the AMI, which it has been recognised may not 
tap into the types of memories that are fundamental in the formation or preservation 
of the self (Caddell & Clare, 2010), or memories from the mid-life point (Naylor & 
Clare, 2008). The current study therefore attempts to address this by using the Self-
defining memory task (SDMT; Singer & Moffitt, 1991-1992), which is specifically 
designed to measure memories of experiences that reflect a person’s identity and 
how they define themselves.   
Indeed, Singer and Salovey (1993) describe self-defining memories as 
recollections that are emotionally intense, repetitive, vivid, and comprise enduring 
concerns about oneself.  These memories represent recollections of experiences that 
reflect one’s identity because, by definition, self-defining memories comprise 
narratives that individuals draw on to inform their sense of identity (Blagov & 
Singer, 2004).  Singer and Salovey also found that eliciting self-defining memories 
resulted in a higher proportion of memories deemed important to the participant than 
a standard autobiographical memory task.  This may therefore be a beneficial 
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approach to understanding AM in dementia given that the self is assumed to be 
closely linked to AM.   
1.7.1 Study Aims 
The majority of the evidence provided above indicates that the sense of self is 
affected in dementia to some degree, whether as a result of cognitive deficits, or via 
the adverse behavioural, psychological and social consequences of the dementing 
illness.  Nevertheless, how the self is altered and to what extent still remains unclear.  
Similarly, there appears to be a large amount of research, which suggest that 
emotional distress is commonly experienced in PWD as a result of these factors.  
The current study therefore aims to delineate some of these factors by first 
examining if self-discrepancies are related to emotional distress in people with mild 
dementia.  Second, it will explore whether certain impairments in AM (e.g., OGM 
and fewer integrative memories) are associated with emotional distress in PWD.  
Third, it aims to investigate if self-discrepancies are associated with AM deficits.  
Fourth, it attempts to investigate if PWD define their current self-concept in terms of 
their dementing illness, and if this is associated with emotional distress.  In 
examining these areas, it is hoped that the current study will expand on the existing 
literature investigating the self and AM in dementia, as well as provide a novel 
examination of how these variables relate to emotional distress in PWD. 
1.8 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Based on the review of the existing literature, the primary and secondary 
(exploratory) research questions and hypotheses to be explored in the current study 
are outlined below.  
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1.8.1 Primary Research Questions 
1. Is there a relationship between self-discrepancies and emotional distress in 
people with mild dementia?  
 Primary hypothesis 1: Greater self-discrepancies (as indicated by AI and 
AO self-discrepancies) will be related to higher levels of overall 
emotional distress. 
 Secondary hypothesis 1: Higher AI self-discrepancies will be associated 
with higher levels of depression. 
 Secondary hypothesis 2: Higher AO self-discrepancies will be associated 
with higher levels of anxiety. 
2. Is there a relationship between OGM and depression in people with mild 
dementia?  
 Primary hypothesis 2: Recall of fewer specific memories will be 
associated with higher levels of depression.   
3. Is there a relationship between AM integration and emotional distress in 
people with mild dementia? 
 Primary hypothesis 3: Recall of fewer AM integrative memories will be 
associated with higher levels of overall emotional distress. 
1.8.2. Secondary Research Questions 
1. Is there a relationship between self-discrepancies and AM in people with 
mild dementia? 
 Secondary hypothesis 3: Greater self-discrepancies (as indicated by AI 
and AO self-discrepancies) will be associated with recall of fewer 
specific memories. 
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 Secondary hypothesis 4: Greater self-discrepancies (as indicated by AI 
and AO self-discrepancies) will be associated with lower levels of AM 
fluency.   
 Secondary hypothesis 5: Greater self-discrepancies (as indicated by AI 
and AO self-discrepancies) will be associated with recall of fewer 
integrative memories. 
 Secondary hypothesis 6: Greater self-discrepancies (as indicated by AI 
and AO self-discrepancies) will be associated with recall of fewer AM 
memories from the childhood and early adulthood lifetime periods.  
2. Is there a relationship between dementia-related self-attributes and emotional 
distress in people with mild dementia? 
 Secondary hypothesis 7: Greater dementia-related self-attributes will be 
associated with higher levels of overall emotional distress. 
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2. Chapter Two - Method 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter will outline the design of the present study and details about the 
participants recruited.  Inclusion and exclusion criteria will be described, along with 
a discussion of the ethical considerations regarding recruitment.  The measures used 
in the study will then be outlined, followed by a description of the procedure used in 
current study.  The chapter is concluded with a section detailing the planned 
analyses. 
2.2 Design 
 This study employed a correlational design to investigate the relationship 
between AM, self-discrepancies and emotional distress. Measures of these three 
respective areas were given to participants at a single time point.  In the next section, 
the sample used in the current study will be described and an outline of how they 
were recruited is provided.  A power analysis is also described, along with the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria.  Ethical considerations in relation to the sample are 
also discussed.    
2.3 Participants 
 A total of 33 participants completed the questionnaire booklets, 22 of whom 
were male, and 11 of whom were female.  The ages of participants ranged from 64 to 
88 years old, with a mean age of 77.61 years (SD = 5.76).  The length of time since 
being diagnosed with dementia ranged from one month to 66 months (M = 16.44, SD 
= 15.75).  Participants were recruited from the Norfolk region in the UK from Older 
People’s Community Mental Health Teams (OPCMHTs), charity groups and a day 
care centre (Table 2). 
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An invitation letter or email (Appendix A) was sent to team leaders and 
managers of these locations to inform them of the study and request permission to 
attend a team meeting to highlight the study to staff, or to ask to attend a carers or 
cared for group/meeting.  A participant information sheet (Appendix B), a poster 
advertisement for the study (Appendix C), and the inclusion and exclusion criteria 
were also included.  A request to advertise for potential participants via the poster 
was also made, where this was appropriate.  Following consent from team leaders 
and managers, the lead researcher visited the different teams and groups/meetings to 
outline the details of the study to staff members, and/or carers or the cared for.  Staff 
were asked to approach any potential participants to take part in the research who 
they felt may be interested and appropriate, in light of the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria.  Similarly, carers were also asked to discuss the research with their relative 
if they were suitable to see if they would like to take part.  It was requested that they 
give any suitable individuals a participant information sheet and to ask them if they 
would give consent to provide their contact details (Appendix D) for the lead 
researcher to call them if they did not contact the lead researcher directly themselves.  
Where permission was given to advertise, posters were placed on service 
noticeboards to publicise the study.  The posters were headed with the slogan 
‘Research into the psychological understanding of emotional distress in mild 
dementia.’  Brief details of the nature of the research were outlined, along with the 
lead researcher’s name and contact details. 
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Table 2 
Source of Participants 
Type of Service Number of Participants Recruited (%) 
OPCMHT 24 (72.7) 
Charity group  8 (24.2) 
Day care centre 1 (3.0) 
 Note. n = 33 
2.3.3 Power Analysis 
A power analysis completed prior to the study commencing indicated that the 
number of participants required for the study for an acceptable level of statistical 
power (.80) to complete a correlation was 21. This was assessed using G*Power 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007). The parameters for this analysis were 
based on a large effect size (r = .5), and alpha at .05.  A large effect size was used 
based on previous research which found a large effect size for PWDAM deficits and 
impairment of identity in AD (r = .56) (Addis & Tippett, 2004).  
2.3.4 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Participants were included in the study if they: 
1) were aged 18 and over 
2) had a formal diagnosis of probable AD, vascular or mixed dementia (this was 
established by speaking to a member of staff or a carer) 
3) were in the early-stages of dementia, as indicated by an MMSE (Folstein et 
al., 1975) score of 18 or above 
Participants were excluded from the study if they: 
1) lacked mental capacity to consent to taking part in the research 
2) had any other form of dementia  
3) had insufficient fluency in English  
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4) had any acquired language problems, preventing ability to communicate 
adequately  
5) had any other neurological abnormalities other than those associated with 
their dementia 
Criterion number three of the inclusion criteria was set based on other studies in 
the area that have used people in the earlier stages of dementia (e.g., Naylor & Clare, 
2008).  Criterion number two of the exclusion criteria was included because AM 
impairments are typically only salient in AD and vascular dementia (e.g., Almkvist 
et al., 1993; Graham & Hodges, 1997), therefore only these types of dementia and 
mixed dementia were explored in the current study. Additionally, the latter three 
exclusion criteria were set to enable the use of standardised self-report measures and 
are similar to the exclusion criteria used in other studies in this area of research (e.g., 
Addis & Tippett, 2004; Naylor & Clare, 2008).    
2.3.5 Ethical Considerations 
 Ethical approval to conduct this study was sought from Norfolk Research 
Ethics Committee (National Health Service) and a favourable opinion was granted 
(Appendix E). In addition, Research and Development approval was applied for to 
Norfolk and Waveney  Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust, Suffolk Mental Health 
Partnership NHS Trust and Cambridgeshire and Peterborough NHS Foundation 
Trust. Approval was provided by all three.  However, no participants were recruited 
from the latter two Trusts as a sufficient number of participants were obtained from 
Norfolk. 
2.3.5.1 Informed consent.  Before participants took part in the study, they 
were required to read a participant information sheet, outlining details of the study 
and their rights to withdraw at any stage without it affecting current treatment they 
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may be receiving. Once they had read and understood the participant information 
sheet, and indicated that they were willing to participate, they were asked to initial 
and sign a consent form, to show their willingness to take part in the study.  At least 
72 hours were given between participants receiving the participant information sheet 
and signing the consent form.  No coercion or deception was used in this study and 
participants’ decision to take part was entirely voluntary. 
2.3.5.2 Confidentiality and anonymity.  Questionnaires were provided in an 
anonymised booklet, which was coded and only accessible to the lead researcher and 
her supervisor. Codes were not used on consent forms so there was no way of 
identifying a participant’s responses. If participants wished to be informed about the  
findings of the study, they were given the opportunity to leave their contact details 
on a separate sheet. These details were kept separate from participants’ questionnaire 
booklets. Contact details were destroyed after feedback was provided. Participant 
information was stored securely and only accessible to the lead researcher and her 
supervisor. Paper information was stored in locked cabinets and electronic 
information was kept on a computer and/or data stick requiring a private password, 
which only the lead researcher and her supervisor had access to.  This information 
included no personally identifiable data.  All data was used in accordance with the 
Data Protection Act (1998) and will be destroyed after 15 years. 
2.3.5.3 Risks to the participant.  Possible risks to participants were 
minimised in several ways: 1) participants were advised on the participant 
information sheet to contact their General Practitioner (GP) or healthcare/key worker 
if they had any concerns or felt distressed as a result of taking part in the study, 2) 
following completion of the questionnaire booklet, a debrief was given by the lead 
researcher (a trainee clinical psychologist), and participants were given the 
59 
 
opportunity to raise any concerns or ask any questions, 3) participants’ GP and/or 
healthcare/key worker were informed of their patient’s involvement in the research, 
and 4) participants were provided with the contact details of the NHS Patient and 
Advice Liaison Service (PALS), and the supervisor of the lead researcher at UEA (a 
clinical psychologist) on the participant information sheet if they wanted to discuss 
any concerns they had about the study. 
2.3.5.4 Mental capacity.  In order to ensure that participants had mental 
capacity to consent to participate in the study, the following action was taken: 1) 
discussion with a participant’s healthcare/key worker to establish their professional 
opinion of the person’s mental capacity to consent to participate, and 2) when 
participants were given the participant information sheet to read the staff member 
who provided the sheet and/or the lead researcher  made an assessment of whether 
the person was able to give meaningful consent to participate. This was assessed by 
the participant’s understanding and willingness to be involved. It was also checked 
whether they could retain the information provided to them and weigh this up in 
order to make, and communicate, a decision. These actions are in accordance with 
guidelines set out in the Mental Capacity Act (1983). 
In the next section, the demographic information of the current sample is 
outlined.  The measures used in the present study are also described. 
2.4 Measures 
 
2.4.1 Demographic Information 
  A questionnaire was given to participants requesting a range of demographic 
information (Appendix F).  Details of these demographics are presented in Table 3.  
In addition, participants were also asked about care and living arrangements, and the 
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type of services that they were currently using.  This information is summarised in 
Table 4. 
Table 3 
Demographic Information for Participants 
 Frequency Percentage  
Marital status   
 Married 27 81.8 
 Divorced 1 3.0 
 Widowed 4 12.1 
 Cohabiting 1 3.0 
Ethnicity   
 White British 33 100 
Education level   
 Some secondary 22 66.7 
 GCSE or O-Level 5 15.2 
 A-Level 3 9.1 
 Diploma 1 3.0 
 Undergraduate/Postgraduate 2 6.1 
Employment   
 None 32 97.0 
 Voluntary 1 3.0 
Type of dementia   
 AD 23 69.7 
 VaD 4 12.1 
 Mixed dementia 6 18.2 
Previous mental illness   
 Depression 3 9.1 
 Post-traumatic stress 
disorder 
2 6.1 
 Bi-polar disorder 1 3.0 
Dementia medication   
 Donepezil 17 51.5 
 Rivastigmine 5 15.2 
 Galantamine 4 12.1 
Involvement in other interventions   
 CST group 9 27.3 
Note. n = 33 
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Table 4 
 
Participant Living and Care Arrangements and Service Use 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Living arrangements   
 Home 33 100 
Type of carer   
 No carer 2 6.1 
 Family carer 26 78.7 
 Friend and paid carer 1 3.0 
 Family and paid carer 3 9.0 
 Paid carer 1 3.0 
Number of carers   
 0 2 6.0 
 1 23 69.6 
 2 5 15.1 
 3 3 9.0 
Services used   
 OPCMHT 26 78.7 
 Charity 3 9.0 
 Day care centre 3 9.0 
 Memory club 1 3.0 
Note. n = 33 
 
2.4.2 Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein et al., 1975) 
 
 The MMSE was used to assess level of cognitive impairment in the current 
study.  It is a brief assessment of global cognitive impairment in dementia, which is 
scored out of 30.  Scores of 24 or under indicate a dementia syndrome.  Typically, 
mild dementia is suggested by a score of 18-24 and moderate to severe dementia by 
scores of 17 or less (Folstein et al., 1975).  The MMSE has good levels of internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .90) (Albert & Cohen, 1992) and test-retest 
reliability (r > .75) (Tombaugh & McIntyre, 1992).  Construct validity has also been 
found to be adequate (Jones & Gallo, 2000) as well as concurrent validity with the 
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Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Wechsler, 1955) (r = .66) (Folstein et al., 1975).  
Other tests of cognitive impairment, such as the ACE-R (Mioshi et al., 2006) were 
considered for use, however, the MMSE was deemed most appropriate for use in the 
current study as it is widely used in research (Jones & Gallo, 2000), and is also a 
very brief measure, therefore placing less burden on participants. 
2.4.3 Selves Questionnaire (SQ; Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985) 
 The SQ (Appendix G) was selected to assess self-discrepancies in the present 
study. This is an idiographic free recall measure, which assesses individuals’ current 
discrepancies between their self-representations of their ‘actual’ (the type of person 
they believe they currently are), ‘ideal’ (the type of person they hope or aspire to be) 
and ‘ought’ selves (the type of person they believe it is their duty to be). 
Respondents were asked to verbally provide the lead researcher with up to 10 
attributes for each of these self-states. They then rated the extent to which they felt 
they possessed that attribute on a scale ranging from 1 (slightly) to 4 (extremely).   
Self-discrepancies were calculated in a standardised format according to the 
method described by Higgins, Klein, and Strauman (1987).  The AI and AO self-
discrepancies were determined by comparing each ‘actual’ self attribute to the 
attributes listed in the ‘ideal’ and ‘ought’ self lists using an online thesaurus tool 
(www.theasuarus.com).  Specifically, each word pair was classified as either: 1) a 
synonymous match (if the words were synonyms and differed by less than two extent 
ratings) (weighted by -1), 2) a synonymous mismatch (if the words were synonyms 
and differed by two or more extent ratings) (weighted by +1), 3) an antonymous 
mismatch (opposites) (weighted by 2), or 4) a non-match (if the words were neither 
synonymous or antonymous) (weighted by 0).   
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Based on Higgins et al. (1987) scoring system, these weighted frequencies 
were then summed to provide a measure of self-discrepancy magnitude. Scores are 
calculated on a continuous scale, with a score of 0 or below signifying self-
consistency and a score above 0 representing self-inconsistency (self-discrepancy).  
These scores were used in the analyses of the current study.  Additionally, actual self 
attributes were coded for whether they appeared to be dementia- related (e.g., 
confused, forgetful).  Scores ranged from 0-10 and the total score was used in the 
analyses of the present study to assess dementia-related self-attributes.  An 
independent rater blind to the research questions and hypotheses coded 20% of 
responses for AI and AO self-discrepancies, and the number of dementia-related 
self-attributes.  Inter-rater reliability was found to be acceptable (see section 3.4.2).  
Where there was disagreement on coding, discussion took place until agreement was 
reached. 
The SQ has been used with older adults and effectively identified  AO self-
discrepancies (e.g., Francis, Boldero, & Newson, 2002), thereby indicating that it 
was appropriate for use in the current study. The reliability and validity of the 
measure is also acceptable.  Inter-rater reliabilities between .80 and .94 have been 
found (e.g., Scott & O’Hara, 1993; Strauman & Glenberg, 1994) and test-retest 
reliabilities range from .39 to .65 over 4 weeks to 2 months (Moretti & Higgins, 
1990). Content validity has been established to some degree as discrepancy scores 
have been found to be associated with emotions in the manner that self-discrepancy 
theory predicts (i.e., AO self-discrepancies are associated with depressive disorders, 
while AO self-discrepancies are related to anxiety disorders) (e.g., Strauman & 
Higgins, 1987).  However, the discriminant validity of the SQ between AI and AO 
self-discrepancies has been questioned due to high inter-correlations between the two 
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constructs (e.g., Tangney et al., 1998).  Nonetheless, the SQ is still widely used in 
self-discrepancy research (see Arena, 2008). 
2.4.4 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
The HADS was used to measure emotional distress in the current study.  It is 
a quick, 14-item self-report measure used to assess levels of anxiety and depression 
independently over the past week. Unlike some other measures of depression and 
anxiety, it excludes somatic symptoms, therefore avoiding potential confounding 
issues (Snaith & Zigmond, 1994). It is routinely used in older people research (e.g., 
Flint & Rifat, 2002) due to the co-existence of physical health problems being more 
likely in older age. Therefore it was considered appropriate for this study.  Given that 
self-discrepancies are correlated with depressive and anxiety symptoms (e.g., 
Strauman & Higgins, 1987) it was important to measure both anxiety and depression 
in the current study. This measure therefore enabled the measurement of both of 
these constructs, and an overall emotional distress score, whilst also making testing 
less onerous for participants.  
Each question has four possible responses which are scored on a scale from 3 
to 0. The maximum score is 21 for depression and 21 for anxiety. A score of 11 or 
higher indicates the probable presence of a mood disorder and a score of 8-10 is 
suggestive of a disorder (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). Each sub-scale on the HADS is 
divided into four ranges: normal (0-7), mild (8-10), moderate (11-15) and severe (16-
21). Although originally tested on people aged 16-65, the HADS has been found to 
be an effective bi-dimensional measure of depression and anxiety in older adults, 
with high internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha  = .77 and .76 for the depression and 
anxiety sub-scales, respectively) and construct validity (Flint & Rifat, 2002). A 
separate score for anxiety and depression was used in the analyses of the current 
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study. Additionally, an overall emotional distress score was calculated and used in 
the analyses by summing the scores on the anxiety and depression sub-scales.  This 
can be utilised a global distress measure (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, & Neckelmann, 
2002). 
2.4.5 Self-defining memory task (SDMT; Singer & Moffitt, 1991-1992) 
The SDMT (Appendix H) was selected to measure AM in the present study. 
This task requires individuals to identify five self-defining memories, broadly 
described as “a memory from your life that you remembered very clearly and that 
still feels important to you even as you think about it” (Singer & Moffitt, 1991-
1992).  Participants were required to articulate their memories to the primary 
researcher, and responses were recorded verbatim.  Participants were then asked to 
rate how they felt about recalling the first memory out of the five they retrieved in 
terms of the emotions that they felt, and also how vivid and important the memory 
was to them.  This was done using a scale of 0 (‘not at all’) to 6 (‘extremely’). They 
also indicated how many years ago the memory took place. 
For this study, coding was carried out in accordance with Singer and 
Blagov’s (2000-2001) manual, which stipulates that memories can be coded by their 
structure (specific or general) and meaning (integrative or non-integrative). A 
specific memory was defined as being a unique occurrence with a duration of less 
than one day (e.g., “the day that I got married to my wife…we were dressed up to the 
nines and it was a beautiful day”).  An integrative memory was defined in terms of 
what the memory had taught the individual and how it had conveyed meaning in 
their life (e.g., “the death of my mother was a turning point in my life and I came to 
realise that life is too short not to do what you want”).  A score for AM specificity 
was based on the total number of specific self-defining memories given (0-5).  
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Similarly, AM integration was scored by the total number of integrative self-defining 
memories reported (0-5).  In the analyses of the present study, the specificity score 
was used to measure OGM (i.e., a lower score indicated OGM) and the integration 
score was used to assess AM integration (i.e., a lower score indicated impairment in 
AM integration).  Inter-rater reliability for these categories has been found to be 
within acceptable limits (.54-.98 for structure and .70-.72 for meaning) (Singer & 
Blagov, 2000-2001).  
In the current study, self-defining memories were also assessed for which life 
stage the memory was retrieved from.  These consisted of childhood (before the age 
of 18) and early adulthood (ages 18-30).  The scores for each lifetime period ranged 
from 0-5 memories and total scores for each lifetime period were used in the 
analyses of the current study to assess AM lifetime period.  Timeframes were 
included in the present study in view of findings which suggest that memories from 
certain life periods have been closely associated with the self and identity 
(Fitzgerald, 1988; Conway, 1997).  Lifetime periods have previously been assessed 
in self-defining memories (e.g., Sutherland & Bryant, 2005).  The level of fluency of 
memories is also typically used to assess AM (e.g., Dritschel et al., 1992).  
Therefore, this was measured in the current study by summing the number of words 
used to describe five self-defining memories, providing a total AM fluency score, 
which was used in the analyses. 
In view of the present study’s aims to explore the self and AM, this measure 
was chosen because it specifically indexes memories that are personally important to 
the individual, rather than valenced memories which are typically accessed in 
autobiographical memory cueing tasks (Jansari & Parkin,1996; Rybash & 
Monaghan, 1999). Given that valenced memories are less relevant to the research 
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aims than memories that are self-defining, the SDMT was considered the most 
appropriate measure for this study.  Indeed, Singer and Salovey (1993) found that 
eliciting self-defining memories resulted in a higher proportion of memories deemed 
important to the participant than a standard autobiographical memory task.  In this 
study, a proportion of memories (20%) were coded for specificity and integration by 
an independent rater blind to the research questions or hypotheses.  Acceptable 
levels of inter-rater reliability were achieved (see section 3.4.2).  Where any 
disagreement was apparent in coding, discussion took place until agreement was 
obtained. 
In the next section, the procedure used in the current study is outlined.  
2.5 Procedure 
Participants who were recruited via an OPCMHT were initially approached 
by a member of staff within the team.  The member of staff provided a participant 
information sheet to the individual.  Participants were asked to read this sheet.  After 
reading the information sheet, if individuals showed an interest in participating in the 
study they were asked to sign a form with their contact details indicating their 
consent for the lead researcher to contact them.  In the case of participants recruited 
through charity groups or the day care centre, either potential participants or their 
carers were approached by the lead researcher.  Following this, the same procedure 
outlined above was carried out.  
During initial contact the staff member or lead researcher made an 
assessment to see if the participant had mental capacity to consent to participate in 
the research.  Only participants deemed to have mental capacity were provided with 
an information sheet and asked to take part.  Where participants were identified via a 
discussion with their carer (a relative), the inclusion and exclusion criteria were 
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outlined to the carer.  Then together with a member of staff a judgement was made 
whether a participant may be suitable for the study, and whether they had mental 
capacity to consent to participate in the research.  Where a judgement was made that 
a participant lacked, or may lack, mental capacity to consent to the research, they 
were not asked to take part in the study.  
Participants who were deemed to have mental capacity to consent to the 
research were provided with two options to indicate their willingness to take part.  
For example, they were informed that they could either contact the lead researcher 
directly if they wished to take part using the contact details of the researcher that 
were provided on the participant information sheet.  Or, if they had given consent to 
use their contact details, the person was informed that they would be contacted by 
the lead researcher after a week to see if they wished to participate in the study.   
Once participants had provisionally agreed to participate (either via directly 
contacting the lead researcher themselves or by providing their written consent to be 
contacted by the lead researcher), a brief telephone conversation took place with 
them and usually a carer to see if they still wished to take part.  For people who 
declined to take part, their contact information was destroyed and no further contact 
was made.  If agreement was given to participate, it was first checked to see if 
participants had read the participant information sheet and understood the details of 
the study.  During this time, the lead researcher made an assessment of the person’s 
mental capacity to take part in the research.  It was also checked to see if they met 
the inclusion criteria.  Participants were given the opportunity to ask any questions 
about the study.  If participants chose to proceed to participate, a convenient time 
and location was agreed upon for the person to complete the questionnaire booklet 
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with the lead researcher.  All participants wished to be seen at home; therefore all 
assessments were completed in participants’ homes.   
The questionnaire booklets included the demographic information, the SQ, 
SDMT, MMSE and HADS. Two different sets of booklets were used to 
counterbalance the measures, in order to control for order effects.  These consisted of 
the demographics, SQ, SDMT, MMSE and HADS (booklet A) and the 
demographics, SDMT, SQ, MMSE and HADS (booklet B).  The MMSE was given 
after the assessments used to measure AM and self-discrepancies to avoid any 
potential negative effects of testing.   
  At the meeting, participants were again asked if they understood the 
participant information sheet and during this time the lead researcher checked again 
to ensure that the participant had mental capacity to consent to take part.  If it was 
decided that they had capacity, participants were asked to sign a consent form 
(Appendix I).  The lead researcher then worked through the questionnaire booklet 
with the participant.  Regular breaks were offered to participants to prevent fatigue.  
Following completion of the questionnaire, a debrief was given by the lead 
researcher and participants were given the chance to ask any questions.  They were 
also asked if they wanted feedback of the findings.  If they did, their contact details 
were collected on a separate sheet of paper, which were kept separate to their 
responses.  They were also asked to provide details of their GP and/or healthcare 
worker so that a letter could be sent to them informing them of the participant’s 
involvement in the study (Appendix J).  Participants were thanked for their time and 
informed of an approximate date of when to expect the feedback if requested. 
 In the next section, the plans for analysing the data in the present sample are 
described. 
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2.6 Plan of Analysis 
All analyses were carried out using Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS).  Descriptive statistics were used to analyse the demographic 
information, and the mean scores and standard deviations on the SQ, SDMT, MMSE 
and HADS were computed.  Checks for normal distribution were performed on all 
variables, as well as reliability and validity checks for the measures used.  
Preliminary analyses were carried out using correlation coefficient tests to determine 
associations between the length of time since diagnosis and MMSE scores and all 
variables of interest.  Correlational analyses were performed to check for 
comparisons between dementia groups (AD group and combined VaD and mixed 
dementia) on all variables of interest, as well as checking for difference in age and 
MMSE scores.   
The main analyses for all research questions involved using parametric or 
non-parametric tests of correlations (Pearson’s product moment correlation 
coefficient or Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient), depending on the normal 
distribution of variables.  Primary hypotheses were analysed using one-tailed tests 
and secondary (exploratory) hypotheses with two-tailed tests.  There was no missing 
data in the dataset.  An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests, other than 
when adjusting for Bonferroni corrections.  The latter procedure was determined by 
dividing .05 by the number of comparisons being made. 
Analyses involved separate correlations between: a) SQ (AI and AO self-
discrepancies) and the HADS (total score, anxiety and depression) (Primary 
Research Question 1), b) the SDMT (AM specificity) and the depression score on the 
HADS (Primary Research Question 2), c) the SDMT (AM integration) and the total 
score on the HADS (Primary Research Question 3), c) the SQ (AI and AO self-
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discrepancies) and all scores on the SDMT (AM specificity, AM fluency, AM 
integration and AM lifetime period [childhood and early adulthood lifetime periods]) 
(Secondary Research Question 1), and d) the number of reported dementia-related 
self-attributes and the total score on the HADS (Secondary Research Question 2).   
Additional analyses were also performed using a one-sample t-test to 
compare the mean score on AM specificity in the current sample to that of a healthy 
older adults group.  Comparisons between AI and AO self-discrepancies scores in 
the present sample were also computed using a paired-samples t-test. 
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3. Chapter Three - Results 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter will first outline the descriptive statistics for all the measures 
used in the current study.  Information on normal distribution checks will then be 
presented, along with reliability and validity checks for relevant measures.  
Preliminary and comparative analyses will then be summarised, followed by the data 
analyses for all research questions and hypotheses.  Additional analyses will also be 
outlined.  The chapter will conclude with a summary of the overall results. 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for scores on self-discrepancies (AI and AO) and 
dementia-related self-attributes (SQ-DRSA) (all measured by the SQ) are presented 
in Table 5.  Descriptive statistics for AM scores (as measured by the SDMT) for: 1) 
fluency (SDMT-F), 2) specificity (SDMT-S), 3) integration (SDMT-I), and 4) 
lifetime period (childhood [SDMT-LP(C)]and early adulthood [SDMT-LP(EA)]) are 
also outlined in Table 5. Emotional distress was examined using the total score and 
separate anxiety and depression scores on the HADS (hereafter referred to as HADS-
T, HADS-A and HADS-D, respectively).  Descriptive statistics for these scores can 
also be found in Table 5.  
 In the current study just under half of the sample (45.4%) reported 
symptoms suggestive of an anxiety disorder (i.e., scores above the normal range) and 
just under one fifth (18.1%) reported symptoms suggestive of a depressive disorder 
(i.e., scores above the normal range).  In relation to cognitive functioning (as 
measured by the MMSE), participants’ scores ranged from 18 to 28 (M = 22.30, SD 
= 3.34).  On the SQ, participants’ scores ranged from -2 (self-consistency) to 5 (self-
discrepancy). 
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Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations for Self-Discrepancies, Autobiographical Memory, 
and Emotional Distress  
 M SD  
AI self – discrepancies 0.60* 4.82 
AO self – discrepancies -2.12* 3.89 
SQ-DRSA 1.88 1.78 
SDMT – S 2.15 1.43 
SDMT – I 0.12 0.33 
SDMT – F 119.90 61.55 
SDMT – LP(C) 1.84 1.32 
SDMT – LP(EA) 1.60 1.02 
HADS – T 11.24 5.35 
HADS – D 4.36 2.79 
HADS – A 6.87 3.49 
 Note. n = 33 
* Scores above zero denote self-discrepancy and scores below zero represent self-consistency. 
 
3.3 Normal Distribution Checks 
The normal distribution of all variables of investigation were checked by 
visually examining histograms and assessing skewness and kurtosis.  Z-scores were 
calculated for all variables using skewness and kurtosis figures (by dividing each 
value by its standard error) and measured to ascertain if they were above z = 1.96.  
Values exceeding this number are considered to be significantly different from a 
normal distribution (Field, 2009).  The majority of variables met the assumptions for 
normal distribution, except those measuring AI and AO self-discrepancies, 
dementia-related self-attributes, and SDMT-I.  These variables were all positively 
skewed.   
For positively skewed data, it has been suggested that the data can be 
converted to within normal distribution parameters by using a logarithm 
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transformation technique (Pallant, 2010).  However, this technique was not possible 
for these variables due to the data containing either or both zero and negative values.  
Where outliers were identified in these variables they were either changed or left 
unaltered depending on how much influence they had on the overall distribution.  A 
total of four outliers for the variables measuring AI and AO self-discrepancies, and 
one outlier for SQ-DRSA were considered to be significantly skewing the overall 
data.  Therefore, these outliers were altered and converted the data to within normal 
distribution limits.  This was done by using a method outlined in Field (2009), which 
involved changing the scores of the outliers to be one unit above the next highest 
score in the data set.   
Transformation of the data for SDMT-I was unsuitable given the 
considerable number of zero values in the data, and was therefore left unchanged.  
Thus, analyses involving AM integration were performed using non-parametric tests.  
Analyses of all other variables were conducted using parametric tests.   
3.4 Reliability and Validity Checks 
3.4.1 Reliability of the HADS 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (α) was calculated for the current sample (n = 
33) and was found to be .80 for the total scale, .79 for the anxiety subscale, and .65 
for the depression subscale.  It has been recommended that α values should be at 
least .60 for a self-report instrument to be reliable (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994), 
although scores above .70 and .80 are considered preferable (Kline, 1999).  The α 
values for the current sample therefore indicate adequate to good internal 
consistency.  These scores are also consistent with previous research involving older 
adults (e.g., Flint & Rifat, 2002). 
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3.4.2 Inter-Rater Reliability of the SDMT and SQ 
 Inter-rater reliability for specificity and integration was assessed on the 
SDMT, and for AI and AO self-discrepancies and dementia-related self-attributes on 
the SQ.  An independent rater coded 20% of the questionnaires.  The rater was blind 
to the research questions and hypotheses.  Agreement for specificity and integration 
was found to be good (Kappa coefficients = .71 and .88, respectively).  Coding of AI 
and AO self-discrepancies and dementia-related self-attributes also achieved very 
good agreement (Kappa coefficients = .87, .96, and .87, respectively).  According to 
Peat (2001), a Kappa value of .70 represents good agreement and .80 indicates very 
good agreement.  Therefore, the Kappa values found for the current study were in the 
good to very good range. 
3.4.3. Discriminant Validity of the SQ 
In light of findings that have found a high correlation between AI and AO 
self-discrepancies (e.g., Tangney et al., 1998), Pearson’s product-moment correlation 
coefficients were performed to compare the scores on AI and AO self-discrepancies 
in the current study.  A significant correlation was found between the two scores (r = 
.70, p < .001, two-tailed), indicating that higher levels of AI self-discrepancies were 
associated with greater AO self-discrepancies.  This suggests that in the current 
sample, AI and AO self-discrepancies may not be independent constructs, as would 
be expected on the SQ. 
3.5 Preliminary Analyses  
3.5.1 Comparisons between all Variables of Investigation and the Length of 
Time since Diagnosis and Cognitive Functioning 
Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficients were carried out to 
determine if there were any associations between the SDMT (SDMT-F, SDMT-S, 
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SDMT-I, SDMT-LP(C), SDMT-LP(EA)), the HADS (HADS-T, HADS-A, and 
HADS-D), the SQ (AI and AO self-discrepancies, and SQ-DRSA), and the length of 
time since diagnosis and cognitive functioning (as measured by the MMSE) (Table 
6).  This was done in order to determine if the length of time since diagnosis or 
cognitive functioning needed to be controlled for in subsequent analyses.  For 
SDMT-I a non-parametric test of correlation (Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient) was used.  Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons was applied 
at alpha level .002.  No significant relationships were found between any sections on 
the SDMT, HADS and SQ, and the length of time since diagnosis and MMSE scores 
following Bonferroni correction.  Therefore, the latter two were not considered in 
subsequent analyses. 
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Table 6 
Correlations between Length of Time since Diagnosis and MMSE Scores and All 
Variables of Investigation 
 MMSE Length of Time Since 
Diagnosis 
 r p r p 
MMSE - - -.25 .15 
Length of time since diagnosis -.25 .15 - - 
AI self-discrepancies .46 .006 -.11 .54 
AO self-discrepancies .06 .72 -.14 .41 
SQ-DRSA .39 .02 .19 .28 
SDMT-S .08 .65 -.13 .47 
SDMT-I -.12 .47 .10 .57 
SDMT-F -.01 .93 -.17 .33 
SDMT-LP(C) -.12 .49 -.00 .98 
SDMT-LP(EA) .15 .39 .08 .63 
HADS-T .35 .04 -.24 .17 
HADS-D .21 .22 -.25 .15 
HADS-A .36 .03 -.16 .36 
Note. n = 33  
Two-tailed tests. 
 
3.6 Comparative Analyses 
3.6.1 Comparisons between Dementia Groups by Diagnosis on all Variables of 
Interest 
To explore any differences between participants based on their diagnosis of 
dementia, participants with AD (n = 23) were compared to those with VaD and 
mixed dementia combined (n = 10) on all variables, as shown in Table 7.  This was 
carried out to determine if subsequent analyses needed to be conducted based on 
dementia type (i.e. as two different groups).  As some of the variables used in this 
comparison were not normally distributed, a two-tailed, non-parametric t-test (Mann-
Whitney U) was performed (adjusted for Bonferroni correction at alpha level .001).  
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The analyses revealed no significant differences between the two groups on any 
variables following Bonferonni correction.  Therefore, all subsequent analyses were 
carried out as a whole group.   
Table 7 
Comparison of Means and Standard Deviations for the Alzheimer’s disease and 
Combined Vascular and Mixed Dementia Groups  
 AD Group 
Mean (SD) 
n = 23  
Combined VaD 
and Mixed 
Dementia Group 
(SD) 
n = 10 
 
U 
 
p 
Age 77.00 (6.02) 79.00 (5.12) 97.50 .49 
MMSE 22.48 (3.27) 21.90 (3.64) 103.00 .63 
Length of time since diagnosis 17.30 (17.08) 14.40 (12.74) 112.50 .92 
AI self-discrepancies 1.65* (4.37) -1.80* (5.20) 65.50 .04 
AO self-discrepancies -1.69* (3.66) -3.10* (4.43) 89.50 .31 
SQ-DRSA 1.83 (1.80) 2.00 (1.82) 107.50 .76 
SDMT-S 2.00 (1.28) 2.50 (1.78) 91.00 .33 
SDMT-I 0.17 (0.39) 0.00 (0.00) 95.00 .16 
SDMT-F 106.04 (56.38) 151.80 (63.88) 67.50 .06 
SDMT-LP(C) 1.91 (1.20) 1.70 (1.64) 96.00 .44 
SDMT-LP(EA) 1.70 (1.20) 1.40 (1.08) 96.00 .43 
HADS-T 10.30 (5.46) 13.40 (4.67) 79.00 .15 
HADS-D 3.87 (2.87) 5.50 (2.37) 76.50 .12 
HADS-A 6.43 (3.51) 7.90 (3.41) 86.50 .26 
Note. * Scores above zero denote self-discrepancy and scores below zero represent self-consistency. 
3.7 Analyses for Research Questions and Hypotheses 
3.7.1. Primary Research Question 1: Is there a Relationship between Self-
Discrepancies and Emotional Distress in People with Mild Dementia? 
 In order to test hypotheses for Primary Research Question 1, Pearson’s 
product moment correlations coefficients were calculated to investigate the 
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relationship between AI and AO self-discrepancies and the three emotional distress 
scores (HADS-T, HADS-A, and HADS-D).  Separate analyses were performed for 
each hypothesis.  Bonferroni correction was set at alpha level .025 for Primary 
Hypothesis 1.  The results of these analyses are presented in Table 8.   
3.7.1.1 Primary hypothesis 1: Greater self-discrepancies (as indicated by 
AI and AO self-discrepancies) will be related to higher levels of overall 
emotional distress.  There was a significant positive correlation found between AI 
self-discrepancies and overall emotional distress, indicating that greater 
discrepancies between actual and ideal self-attributes were significantly associated 
with higher levels of overall emotional distress (combined anxiety and depression).  
However, there was no significant association found between AO self-discrepancies 
and overall emotional distress, although the relationship was in the predicted 
direction (see Appendix K, Figures 2 and 3, for a graphical representation). 
3.7.1.2 Secondary hypothesis 1: Higher AI self-discrepancies will be 
associated with higher levels of depression.  No significant correlation was found 
between AI self-discrepancies and levels of depression, although the relationship 
was in the predicted direction.  However, there was a significant association between 
AI self-discrepancies and levels of anxiety, in that more discrepancy between actual 
and ideal self-attributes were significantly associated with increased levels of 
anxiety.   
3.7.1.3 Secondary hypothesis 2: Higher AO self-discrepancies will be 
associated with higher levels of anxiety.  No significant relationship was found 
between AO self-discrepancies and levels of anxiety, although the relationship was 
in the predicted direction.  There was also no significant correlation between AO 
self-discrepancies and levels of depression. 
80 
 
3.7.2 Summary  
Analyses revealed a significant positive relationship between AI self-
discrepancies and overall emotional distress.  However, no significant association 
was found between AO self-discrepancies and overall emotional distress, although 
the relationship was in the expected direction.   No significant relationships were 
found between AI self-discrepancies and depression, or AO self-discrepancies and 
anxiety.  However, AI self-discrepancies were significantly associated with anxiety.  
These results show mixed outcomes in relation to the predicted hypotheses. 
Table 8 
Correlations between Emotional Distress and Scores on Self-Discrepancies and 
Autobiographical Memory  
 HADS-T HADS-D  HADS-A 
 r p r p r p 
AI self-discrepancies .35 .022 .22 .11 .36 .03** 
AO self-discrepancies .22 .10 .21 .22** .17 .16 
SQ-DRSA .48 .004** - - - - 
SDMT-S .07 .33 -.20 .12 - - 
SDMT-I -.30* .04 - - - - 
 Note. n = 33 
* Spearman’s Rho correlation (non-parametric). 
** Two-tailed tests. 
3.7.3 Primary Research Question 2: Is there a Relationship between OGM and 
Depression in People with Mild Dementia? 
 Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient (one-tailed) was carried 
out to test the hypothesis for Primary Research Question 2.  This analysis involved 
comparing total scores on the SDMT-S (number of specific memories recalled) to 
scores on the HADS-D (Table 8).  
3.7.3.1 Primary hypothesis 2: Recall of fewer specific memories will be 
associated with higher levels of depression.  No significant correlation was found 
81 
 
between OGM and depression (see Appendix K, Figure 4, for a graphical 
representation).  However, the correlation was in the predicted direction, in that 
recall of fewer specific memories was related to higher depression scores.  
3.7.4 Summary 
 The analysis revealed that OGM was not significantly correlated with 
depression.  However, as predicted, the correlation was towards recall of fewer 
specific memories and higher levels of depression.  Nevertheless, this finding does 
not support the predicted hypothesis. 
3.7.5 Primary Research Question 3: Is there a Relationship between AM 
Integration and Emotional Distress in People with Mild Dementia? 
 Given that AM integration was not normally distributed, a one-tailed, non-
parametric test of correlation was used (Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient) to 
test the hypothesis for Primary Research Question 3.  This involved comparing total 
scores on the SDMT-I (number of integrative memories recalled) with scores on 
overall emotional distress (HADS-T) (Table 8).  
3.7.5.1 Primary hypothesis 3: Recall of fewer AM integrative memories 
will be associated with higher levels of overall emotional distress.  A significant 
relationship was found between the number of integrative memories recalled and 
overall emotional distress, in that recall of fewer integrative memories was 
associated with higher levels of overall emotional distress (see Appendix K, Figure 
5, for a graphical representation). 
3.7.6 Summary  
The analysis showed a significant relationship between the number of AM 
integrative memories recalled and overall emotional distress.  Therefore, these 
findings provide support for the predicted hypothesis.   
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3.7.7 Secondary Research Question 1: Is there a Relationship between Self-
Discrepancies and AM in People with Mild Dementia? 
 In order to test the hypotheses for Secondary Research Question 1, separate 
two-tailed, Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficients were conducted.  
Analyses involved comparing AI and AO self-discrepancies with: a) AM specificity 
(SDMT-S), b) AM fluency (SDMT-F), c) AM integration (SDMT-I), and d) AM 
childhood and early adulthood lifetime periods (SDMT-LP(C) and SDMT-LP(EA)) 
(Table 9).  As SDMT-I was not normally distributed, two-tailed, Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficients were used to compare these scores to AI and AO self-
discrepancies.  Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons was set at alpha level 
.025 for Secondary Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5, and .012 for Secondary Hypothesis 6. 
  3.7.7.1 Secondary hypothesis 3: Greater self-discrepancies (as indicated 
by AI and AO self-discrepancies) will be associated with recall of fewer specific 
memories.  Analyses revealed no significant relationships between the number of 
specific memories recalled and either AI or AO self-discrepancies. 
3.7.7.2 Secondary hypothesis 4: Greater self-discrepancies discrepancies 
(as indicated by AI and AO self-discrepancies) will be associated with lower 
levels of AM fluency.  No significant correlations were found between AI and AO 
self-discrepancies and AM fluency. 
3.7.7.3 Secondary hypothesis 5: Greater self-discrepancies discrepancies 
(as indicated by AI and AO self-discrepancies) will be associated with recall of 
fewer integrative memories.  There were no significant relationships between AI 
and AO self-discrepancies and recall of integrative memories.  
3.7.7.4 Secondary hypothesis 6: Greater self-discrepancies discrepancies 
(as indicated by AI and AO self-discrepancies) will be associated with recall of 
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fewer AM memories from the childhood and early adulthood lifetime periods.  
No significant correlations were found between AI and AO self-discrepancies and 
the number of AM memories recalled from the childhood or early adulthood lifetime 
periods.  There was a trend towards a negative relationship between AO self-
discrepancies and recall of AM memories from the childhood lifetime period, but 
this did not reach statistical significance.   
3.7.8 Summary 
Analyses revealed that there were no significant relationships between AI and 
AO self-discrepancies and any AM variables (specificity, fluency, integration, or 
childhood and early adulthood lifetime periods).  There was a trend towards a 
negative association between AO self-discrepancies and recall of AM memories 
from the childhood lifetime period, but this did not reach statistical significant.  
Therefore, these results do not support the predicted hypotheses. 
Table 9 
Correlations between Self-Discrepancies and Autobiographical Memory 
 AI self-discrepancies AO self-discrepancies 
 r p r p 
SDMT-S .01 .94 .04 .79 
SDMT-F -.12 .47 .01 .94 
SDMT-I -.13 .45 -.08 .62 
SDMT-LP(C) -.14 .41 -.30 .09 
SDMT-LP(EA) -.00 .99 .01 .91 
 Note. n = 33 
 
3.7.9 Secondary Research Question 2:  Is there a Relationship between 
Dementia-Related Self-Attributes and Emotional Distress in People with Mild 
Dementia? 
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 To explore Secondary Research Question 2, Pearson’s product-moment 
correlation coefficients were used to compare scores on the SQ-DRSA (the number 
of reported dementia-related self-attributes) and scores on overall emotional distress 
(HADS-T) (Table 8).   
3.7.9.1 Secondary hypothesis 7: Greater dementia-related self-attributes 
will be associated with higher levels of overall emotional distress.  The analysis 
revealed that there was a significant positive correlation between the number of 
reported dementia-related self-attributes and overall emotional distress, indicating 
that more reported dementia-related self-attributes were associated with higher levels 
of overall emotional distress. 
3.7.10 Summary 
 The results showed that there was a significant positive relationship between 
the number of reported dementia-related self-attributes and overall emotional 
distress. 
3.8 Additional Analyses 
3.8.1 Normative Comparisons for OGM 
 In view of the seemingly average scores on AM specificity in the current 
sample, a one-sample t-test was performed to compare the present mean with that of 
a normative age-matched sample.   The mean score on AM specificity in the current 
sample was (M = 2.15, SD = 1.43), while the mean score on AM specificity found in 
healthy older adults was (M = 2.27, SD = 1.79) (Singer, Rexhaj, & Baddeley, 2007).  
These mean scores were not statistically significant (t(32) = -0.47, p = .639, two-
tailed), suggesting that the scores on AM specificity in the present sample did not 
differ from those of a healthy older adults sample. 
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3.8.2 Comparisons between AI and AO Self-Discrepancies 
 Descriptive statistics revealed that AO self-discrepancies were lower (M = -
2.12, SD = 3.89) than AI self-discrepancies (M = 0.60, SD = 4.82) in the current 
sample.  In order to determine if these scores were significantly different, a paired-
samples t-test was carried out.  The results showed that these scores were 
significantly different (t (32) = 4.50, p <. 001, two-tailed), indicating that AI self-
discrepancies were significantly higher than AO self-discrepancies in the current 
sample.   
3.9 Overall Summary of Results 
In this chapter, descriptive statistics were presented, along with information 
about normal distribution checks.  Reliability and validity checks of the measures 
used were performed and were mostly adequate, although the discriminant validity 
of the SQ was found to be questionable due to the overlap between scores on AI and 
AO self-discrepancies.  Preliminary analyses revealed that there were no significant 
correlations between the length of time since diagnosis and cognitive functioning 
and any of the variables of investigation.  Comparative analyses also indicated that 
there were no significant differences between the AD and the combined VaD and 
mixed dementia groups on any of the variables of interest. 
For the main results, correlational analyses were performed to examine the 
relationships between AI and AO self-discrepancies and emotional distress (anxiety, 
depression and overall emotional distress); AI and AO self-discrepancies and AM 
(specificity, fluency, integration, and lifetime period); AM (specificity and 
integration) and emotional distress (depression and overall emotional distress); and 
dementia-related self-attributes and overall emotional distress. 
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As expected, a significant positive association was found between AI self-
discrepancies and overall emotional distress, but this was not the case for AO self-
discrepancies.  However, this was in the predicted direction.  No significant 
relationships were found between AI self-discrepancies and depression, or AO self-
discrepancies and anxiety, although there was a significant positive correlation 
between AI self-discrepancies and anxiety. Analyses also revealed that, as predicted, 
there was a negative relationship between recall of AM integrative memories and 
overall emotional distress.  However, OGM was not found to be significantly 
associated  with depression, although the findings were in the anticipated negative 
direction.   
Results indicated that there were no significant associations between AI and 
AO self-discrepancies and any scores on AM.  However, there was a trend towards a 
negative association between AO self-discrepancies and memories recalled from the 
childhood lifetime period, but this did not reach statistical significance.  Analyses 
further revealed a significant positive relationship between the number of reported 
dementia-related self-attributes and overall emotional distress.   
Finally, the results of additional analyses showed that AI self-discrepancies 
were significantly higher than AO self-discrepancies in the current sample.  
Furthermore, comparison of the mean score on AM specificity from the present 
sample to that of healthy older adults revealed that OGM was not significantly 
different in the current sample.  Therefore, in total, the current findings provide 
partial support for some of the predicted hypotheses.  The results from the present 
study will be discussed in the following chapter.  
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4. Chapter Four - Discussion 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter will discuss the main findings of the current research in relation 
to the existing literature.  A summary of the findings with theoretical implications 
will then be outlined, followed by a discussion of the clinical implications of the 
current study.  The research process will then be discussed, including a critical 
review of the methodology and some reflections on the research process.  Finally, 
suggestions for future research will be described and a conclusion of the present 
study will be presented.  
4.2 Primary Research Question 1: Is there a Relationship between Self-
Discrepancies and Emotional Distress in People with Mild Dementia? 
4.2.1 Discussion of the Findings 
 In the present study it was hypothesised that greater AI and AO self-
discrepancies would be significantly correlated with higher scores on combined 
anxiety and depression (overall emotional distress).  It was also predicted that higher 
AI self-discrepancies would be associated with greater levels of depression, while 
greater AO self-discrepancies would be related to higher scores on anxiety.  The 
results from the current study provide some support for Primary Hypothesis 1, in that 
a significant positive relationship between AI self-discrepancies and overall 
emotional distress was found.  This indicates that greater discrepancy between the 
actual and ideal self-guides was significantly associated with higher levels of overall 
emotional distress.  However, no significant association was found between AO self-
discrepancies and overall emotional distress, although the relationship was in the 
predicted direction.  Moreover, no significant relationships were found between AI 
self-discrepancies and levels of depression, or AO self-discrepancies and levels of 
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anxiety.  Therefore, no support was found for Secondary Hypotheses 1 or 2 in the 
present study.  However, there was a significant positive correlation between AI self-
discrepancies and anxiety.  This suggests that in the current study, more discrepancy 
between the actual and ideal self-attributes was significantly associated with higher 
levels of anxiety. 
The present study was the first to examine self-discrepancies and emotional 
distress in PWD.  The current findings do not support the disorder specific 
contentions of Higgins’ (1987) SDT, which proposes that AI self-discrepancies are 
associated with dejection-related emotions, such as depression, while AO self-
discrepancies are related to agitation-related emotions, such as anxiety.  However, 
the support for SDT (Higgins, 1987) is contentious.  While some studies have found 
associations between particular self-discrepancies and specific types of emotional 
distress (e.g., Scott & O’Hara, 1993; Strauman, 1992), others have found no support 
for the distress specificity tenets of SDT (Higgins, 1987), but instead for an 
association between self-discrepancies and negative affect in general (e.g., Ozgul et 
al., 2003; Tangney et al., 1998).   
The results of the current study are consistent with these findings as AI self-
discrepancies were found to be positively associated with overall emotional distress.  
They are also in line with research which has found personal identity strength to be 
critical in predicting well-being in PWD (e.g., Jetten et al., 2010).  Moreover, Burch 
et al. (2000) found no association between AO self-discrepancies and anxious affect, 
which is in line with the findings of the present study.  In a review of SDT, Arena 
(2008) suggested that the evidence to date indicates a more generalised association 
between self-discrepancies and emotional distress.  The results of the present study 
appear to lend support to this proposition.  Additionally, the finding in the current 
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study that more discrepancy between the actual and ideal self-guides was 
significantly correlated with higher levels of anxiety provides support for a more 
global association between self-discrepancies and emotional distress.  It also 
suggests that depression may not have been particularly prevalent in current sample, 
hence the absence of any findings indicating a relationship between depression 
specifically and self-discrepancies.      
However, it is important to note that this finding, and the failure to identify 
the specific associations between self-discrepancies and different types of emotional 
distress, may in part also be due to difficulties with the measurement of self-
discrepancies using the SQ (Higgins et al., 1985).  Indeed, in order to find unique 
relationships, there must be evidence to suggest that these exist in the first instance.  
In the present study, the inter-correlations between AI and AO self-discrepancies on 
the SQ were high (r = .70, p < .001), suggesting that they may not be tapping into 
different constructs.  Similar results have been found in previous studies using the 
SQ (e.g., Tangney et al., 1998), and also in Higgins et al. (1985) original paper, with 
inter-correlations ranging from r = .53-.80 between AI and AO self-discrepancies.  
These high inter-correlations between AI and AO self-discrepancies suggest poor 
discriminant validity of the SQ.  More recently, Rodebaugh and Donague (2007) 
have also questioned the robustness of the SQ and alternative measures for assessing 
self-discrepancies have been put forward (e.g., Francis, Boldero, & Sambell, 2006).   
In the current study, it was found that AO self-discrepancies were 
significantly lower (M = -2.12, SD = 3.89) than AI self-discrepancies (M = 0.60, SD 
= 4.82).  This suggests that there was more consistency between actual and ought 
self-states than actual and ideal self-states in the present sample.  This may be one 
reason why there were no significant associations between AO self-discrepancies 
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and emotional distress.  Another possibility for why AI self-discrepancies were 
higher in the current sample than AO self-discrepancies is the way in which the SQ 
was administered.  For example, actual self attributes were requested first, then ideal 
self attributes, followed by ought self attributes.  It was recognised by Tangney et al. 
(1998) that generating new and different adjectives of self-assessment over several 
pages may be over-taxing and lead to participants losing sight of subtle distinctions 
in the different self-states.   This may be even more pertinent in a dementia 
population, given the cognitive difficulties associated with the disease.   
An alternative explanation for higher AI self-discrepancies found in the 
current study may be because ideal self-states were more dominant than ought self-
states.  This is acknowledged by Higgins (1987) in his theory, whereby he proposed 
that some people may only possess one self-guide, which they will be more 
motivated to meet.  It is conceivable that ideal self-guides (i.e., ultimate goals for 
oneself) may be more germane in a group of people with mild dementia than ought 
self-guides (i.e., normative rules or prescriptions for oneself) because of the 
incongruence between their actual and ideal selves in the face of the adverse effects 
that their dementing illness may be having on their lives.  Ought self-guides may be 
more grounded in morality and therefore less affected in dementia than goal-
orientated self-guides.   
One other possible explanation for the low AO self-discrepancy scores in the 
present study and therefore a non-significant association with emotional distress may 
be related to the coping strategies adopted by PWD.  Indeed, Clare (2003) found that 
individuals’ sense of their self varied in terms of their reaction to the changes 
associated with the experience of dementia.  She proposed that these ranged from 
“self-maintaining” (i.e., working to maintain an existing identity), to “self-adjusting” 
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(i.e., developing a new sense of self by incorporating changes into their new 
identity).  Some of the findings of this study appear to be consistent with the “self-
maintaining” strategy, in that some people in the current sample may have been 
protecting themselves from having to update and adjust to these identity changes, 
rather than integrate them into their new sense of self.   
Similarly, Naylor and Clare (2008) argue that PWD, as result of AM 
impairments, may fail to update the store of personally-relevant information (i.e., the 
PDB) (Morris & Hannesdottir, 2004), thereby reducing the extent to which the sense 
of self is challenged by perceived changes in functioning and abilities.  This is based 
on the tenets of the Cognitive Awareness Model (Morris & Hannesdottir, 2004), 
which links awareness of memory functioning with AM and indirectly with the self.  
Naylor and Clare (2008) assert that this inability to update the PDB may result in 
psychological defence mechanisms in order to preserve their prior sense of self.  
Some of the results of the current study appear to support these claims, as reflected 
in the low scores on AO self-discrepancies.  Indeed, this finding is more conducive 
to self-consistency between the actual and ought self-states, rather than self-
inconsistency, as proposed by SDT (Higgins, 1987). 
4.3 Primary Research Question 2:  Is there a Relationship between OGM and 
Depression in People with Mild Dementia? 
4.3.1 Discussion of the Findings 
 It was hypothesised in the current study that OGM (i.e., impaired recall of 
specific memories) would be associated with higher levels of depression.  No 
support was found for Primary Hypothesis 2.  However, although not significant, the 
relationship between AM specificity and depression was in the predicted direction, in 
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that recall of fewer specific memories was associated with higher levels of 
depression.   
   One explanation for these findings is that OGM was not particularly 
pronounced in the current sample.  For example, the mean score on AM specificity 
was M = 2.15, SD = 1.43.  This mean is comparable to AM specificity found in 
healthy older adults (M = 2.27, SD = 1.79) (Singer et al., 2007).  Both scores were 
not statistically significant, suggesting that the participants in this sample were no 
more deficient in AM specificity than healthy older adults.  Therefore, given that 
impaired recall of specific memories is typically related to affective disorders (e.g., 
Williams et al., 2007), it may be plausible that a relationship was not detected in the 
present sample due to the relatively average levels of AM specificity.  The small 
sample size in the current study may also be a reason for not identifying significant 
relationships between OGM and depression.  Another possibility may be that the 
sample in the present study was not particularly depressed.  Indeed, typical levels of 
depression seen in PWD range from 30 to 50% (e.g., Taylor et al., 2003), while in 
the current sample only 18.1% of people showed signs suggestive of a depressive 
disorder.  It is important to consider that studies exploring the link between OGM 
and depression have typically been carried out on samples of people who are already 
depressed (e.g., Barnhofer, Jong-Meyer, Kleinpass, & Nikesch, 2002; Kremers, 
Spinhoven, & Van der Does, 2004).  Therefore, given the seemingly low levels of 
depression in the present sample it may not have been possible to detect such 
relationships.  
The findings from the current study in relation to low levels of AM 
specificity are inconsistent with those of Moses et al. (2004), who found a significant 
deficit in the retrieval of specific memories in PWD, compared to healthy controls.  
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However, although no correlations were made between depression and OGM in this 
study, the authors did measure depression using the Geriatric Depression Scale-15 
(Sheikh & Yesavage, 1986) and found no evidence of depression in their sample.  
These findings are similar to the current study, whereby relatively low levels of 
depression were found in comparison to other studies measuring depression in PWD 
(e.g., Taylor et al., 2003). 
Although OGM appeared to be lacking in the current sample, which is 
contrary to the findings of Moses et al. (2004), the comparison of the means between 
the current study and that of Moses et al. was not possible due to different measures 
being used to assess OGM (these authors used the Autobiographical Memory Test; 
Williams & Broadbent, 1986).  Indeed, the differences in measurement may, to some 
extent, account for the dissimilar findings, as well as the small sample size used in 
Moses et al. study (n = 10). 
4.4. Primary Research Question 3: Is there a Relationship between AM 
Integration and Emotional Distress in People with Mild Dementia? 
4.4.1 Discussion of the Findings 
 It was predicted in the current study that recall of fewer integrative memories 
would be associated with higher levels of overall emotional distress.  The results 
from the present study found a significant negative relationship between integrative 
memories and overall emotional distress, therefore supporting Primary Hypothesis 3.  
These findings suggest that the inability to engage in meaning-making from 
autobiographical memories is associated with combined anxiety and depression. 
This is consistent with Blagov and Singer’s (2004) proposition that meaning-
making and the construction of integrative self-defining memories are strategies that 
help people to cope with negative emotions.  Indeed, in the current study it appears 
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that for some participants,  the incapacity to ascribe meaning to their memories is 
associated with emotional distress.  That is, they made  limited linkage between their 
memories and the lessons they learned from them in relation to the self or individual 
growth and change (Singer & Blagov, 2000-2001).   
Integrative memories have been examined in healthy older adults, whereby it 
was found that the recall of integrative memories were higher in older adults than 
college students (Singer et al., 2007).  The mean score for these older adults was M = 
2.29, SD = 1.87.  This is substantially higher than the mean score found in the 
current sample (M = 0.12, SD = 0.33) and suggests that deficiencies in integrative 
memories may be associated with the effects of dementia.  Indeed, Wong & Watt 
(1991), who explored a taxonomy of reminiscence in older adults, suggested that 
integrative reminiscence (i.e., accepting one’s past as worthwhile [Butler, 1963], 
resolving the disparity between ideal and reality [Birren, 1964], and accepting 
negative life events and reconciling past conflicts [Lieberman & Tobin, 1983]) and 
instrumental reminiscence (i.e., drawing from past experiences to solve present 
problems) was associated with more adaptive ageing.  They further proposed that 
this may be related to positive self-schemata, which is consistent with Ross’s (1989) 
premise that personal memories are guided by the self-schemata that one possesses 
in the present.  
The finding in the current study between fewer integrative memories and 
higher levels of emotional distress is also in line with the proposals of Bauer et al. 
(2008), who argue that stories which involve growth and development are linked to 
higher levels of emotional well-being.  The lack of integrative memories retrieved by 
the present sample suggests that PWD may struggle to access or generate memories 
that incorporate growth and development.  In view of findings which indicate that 
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older people retrieve more integrative memories than college students (e.g., Singer et 
al., 2007), it may be something specific about the experience of dementia that 
prevents integrative remembering.  For example, this could be attributable to the 
cognitive dysfunction that accompanies dementia.  Indeed, given that meaning-
making from memories requires a separate cognitive process to generic life review 
(e.g., Blagov & Singer, 2004), it may be this cognitive overload that is too 
demanding for PWD.    
Further exploration of the relationship between integrative remembering and 
emotional distress in PWD using larger samples and a control group may assist with 
delineation of the findings in the current study.  However, although this finding was 
significant even when using a non-parametric statistical test, it should be treated with 
some caution due to the limited variability in the scores measuring integrative 
memories, which may inflate the correlation coefficient.  
4.5 Secondary Research Question 1: Is there a Relationship between Self-
Discrepancies and AM in People with Mild Dementia? 
4.5.1 Discussion of the Findings 
 In the present study it was hypothesised that greater AI and AO self-
discrepancies would be significantly associated with more deficiencies in AM (i.e., 
OGM, lower levels of AM fluency, recall of fewer integrative memories and 
retrieval of fewer memories from the childhood and early adulthood AM lifetime 
periods).  No significant relationships were found between AI and AO self-
discrepancies and any aspects of AM in the current study.  Therefore, these findings 
do not support the current hypotheses. 
 The results did show a trend towards higher AO self-discrepancies and fewer 
memories recalled from the childhood lifetime period, but this did not reach 
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statistical significance .  Nonetheless, this trend is consistent with the reminiscence 
bump phenomenon (e.g., Rathbone et al., 2008) and arguments that autobiographical 
memories from the childhood to early adulthood timeframes (ages 10-30) are crucial 
to the formation of the self and identity (e.g., Conway, 1997; Fitzgerald, 1988).   
 The finding that AI and AO self-discrepancies were not related to OGM in 
the current sample is unsurprising given that OGM did not appear to be particularly 
problematic in this sample, compared to healthy older adults.  Indeed, the mean score 
on AM specificity in the current sample indicates that nearly half of all the AM 
memories retrieved (out of five) were specific.   Reasons for these seemingly high 
scores are outlined in sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1 and similarly apply here for possible 
explanations as to why OGM was not related to self-discrepancies in the present 
study.   
However, it is more surprising that there was no association between 
integrative memories and AI and AO self-discrepancies in the present study given 
the overall low number of integrative memories retrieved in the current sample.  It 
would be expected that deficiencies in the recall of integrative memories would be 
related to impairments in the self and identity given the role they play in providing 
the construction of a life story that uses the past to inform a sense of identity (Blagov 
& Singer, 2004).  However, one explanation for this finding may be to do with the 
measurement difficulties of the SQ described in section 4.2.1.  Moreover, 
conceptualising aspects of the self and identity are problematic (Caddell & Clare, 
2010), and it is possible that other measures of the self and/or identity may detect 
such a relationship.   
The findings of the current study are inconsistent with the SMS (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), which proposes a reciprocal relationship between AM and 
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the self, in that AM serves to maintain the self, while the goals of the working self 
function to activate AM.  They are also contrary to previous research that has found 
an association between AM deficits and impairments in the self and identity in PWD 
(e.g., Addis & Tippett, 2004; Fargeau et al., 2010; Jetten et al., 2010).  For instance, 
Addis and Tippett (2004) found that deficits in autobiographical fluency for 
childhood events and early adulthood names were related to a weaker identity, but no 
such relationship was found in the present study.  However, these studies used 
different measures to assess AM and the self, making direct comparisons 
problematic.  The study by Fargeau et al. (2010) also only found a significant 
correlation between personal semantic fluency and not episodic fluency, the latter of 
which was only explored in present study.  Nevertheless, the results of the current 
study are in line with those of Naylor and Clare (2008) who found no relationship 
between AM and identity in PWD.   
Explanations for the non-significant findings between AM and self-
discrepancies in the current study may again be related to measurement and 
conceptualisation issues as highlighted by Caddell and Clare (2010), and also due to 
the problems with the SQ as summarised in section 4.2.1.  Additionally, the small 
sample size in the study may have prevented significant associations from being 
found.   
Alternatively, another possible reason for not finding a relationship between 
self-discrepancies and AM is that the hypotheses may be inaccurate.  Indeed, the link 
between the self and AM in PWD, although theoretically supported by the SMS 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), is still relatively under-researched and the 
findings are equivocal.  It is possible that self-discrepancies may not tap into the 
dimensions of the self that are most associated with AM.  That is, SDT (Higgins, 
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1987) is a theory based on self-incompatibility, whereas aspects of the self in other 
studies exploring the link between identity and AM in dementia (e.g., Addis & 
Tippett, 2004; Naylor & Clare, 2008) are underpinned by theories of self-coherence, 
which is the element of the self that is purported to be important in the SMS (e.g., 
Conway, 2005).  It is feasible then that self-incompatibility may not be as conducive 
to decline as self-coherence in PWD if it is less associated with AM.  Similarly, it 
may be that self-discrepancies are not pertinent in dementia, particularly if 
psychological defence mechanisms are at play to protect the self (e.g., Clare, 2003; 
Naylor & Clare, 2008).  However, in total, the multi-faceted nature of the self and 
identity makes delineation of the findings in this, and previous studies, challenging. 
4.6 Secondary Research Question 2: Is there a Relationship between 
Dementia-Related Self-Attributes and Emotional Distress in People with Mild 
Dementia? 
4.6.1 Discussion of the Findings 
 In the present study, a significant relationship was found between a higher 
number of reported dementia-related self-attributes and greater levels of combined 
anxiety and depression.  This is consistent with the SRM (Leventhal et al., 1984) of 
adjustment to illness, in which it is proposed that in order to make sense of their 
illness people develop illness representations, which subsequently influence 
emotional and coping responses.  Among others, these illness cognitions incorporate 
beliefs about illness identity (i.e., the label and perceived symptoms of their illness).  
A strong illness identity in people with a chronic illness  has been found to be 
associated with higher levels of depression and anxiety (e.g., Vaughan et al., 2003).  
The results of the current study are in line with these findings, in that people who 
defined their current self-concept in terms of their dementing illness (i.e., who had a 
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stronger illness identity) in the current sample tended to experience higher levels of 
emotional distress.   
It appears that, to some degree, the changes associated with dementia have 
been incorporated into the current self-concept for some people in the current study, 
which is in line with Clare’s (2003) findings of a self-adjusting strategy.  This 
indicates that some people in the current sample may have been fairly aware of their 
difficulties, and were therefore more likely to experience emotional distress.  This is 
consistent with previous findings which have showed that increased awareness of 
difficulties due to being in the milder phases of dementia  are related to higher levels 
of emotional distress (e.g., Aalten et al., 2005; Brierley et al., 2003; Holtzer et al., 
2005).     
 However, these results should be regarded tentatively due to the way in 
which dementia-related self-attributes were measured.  It is acknowledged that these 
were not assessed using any standardised coding procedure and differ to methods 
used to examine illness representations in other studies.  Nevertheless, inter-rater 
reliability from a blind rater did indicate very good agreement for this variable and 
these findings do provide preliminary results which are worthwhile of further 
exploration.   
In the next section, a summary of the overall current findings in relation to 
previous research will be outlined, as well as theoretical implications. 
4.7 Summary of the Current Findings in Relation to the Extant Literature and 
Theoretical Implications 
 The findings of the current study are mixed.  Some relationships between 
AM, the self and emotional distress are consistent with previous research, while 
others do not appear to support the existing literature.   
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The present findings are consistent with SDT to some degree, although they 
do not support the disorder-specificity contentions of the theory.  However, the 
specific relationships between AI self-discrepancies and depression, and AO self-
discrepancies and anxiety have been refuted by several authors, who contend that 
self-discrepancies are associated with negative affect in general.  The results of this 
study tend to lend support to this argument.  Therefore, while it appears that SDT 
may be a useful framework in which to understand emotional distress in people 
dementia, based on the current research and previous findings, a revision may be 
necessary which accounts for a general self-discrepancy model in relation to 
emotional distress more broadly.   
   Deficiencies in integrative memories were the only relevant AM deficit in 
the current study that was associated with emotional distress.  This is in line with 
previous research which has suggested that the failure to ascribe meaning to one’s 
memories is associated with adjustment difficulties.  However, no support was found 
for a significant relationship between OGM and depression in the current sample, 
although the relationship was in the predicted direction.  These findings are contrary 
to those of a large body of research which has found a link between OGM and 
depression.  Yet, this may be because OGM and depression was not particularly 
pronounced in the current sample, therefore making it unlikely that a relationship 
between the two would be detected.  The lack of OGM found in the current sample is 
inconsistent with some other research that has found OGM in PWD, although this 
research was based on a very small sample and used a different method for assessing 
OGM to the measure used in the present study (e.g., Moses et al., 2004).   
No significant relationships were found between AM deficits and self-
discrepancies in the current study, although there was a trend towards greater AO 
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self-discrepancies and less recall of memories from the childhood lifetime period.  
The latter finding is consistent with previous research on the reminiscence bump 
phenomenon and studies that have implicated the childhood timeframe in the 
formation of the self.  Therefore, impairments in memory from this period are likely 
to have the most negative impact on the sense of self.  Although this relationship did 
not reach significance in the current study, it does warrant further investigation.  If a 
significant relationship were to be found in the future this would lend further 
theoretical support to the reminiscence bump phenomenon and its unique 
relationship with the self.  However, the lack of other significant findings between 
AM and the self is partially inconsistent with previous research, which suggests an 
association between integrative memories and the self, and AM fluency and the self.  
Indeed, the findings from the current study do not lend support to the SMS model of 
the self and AM, although it should be noted that the findings in the current study 
should be treated with some degree of caution due to the methodological issues 
which have already been outlined, and which will be discussed further in section 4.8. 
Finally, the current findings did show an association between greater 
dementia-related self-attributes (i.e., a stronger illness identity) and higher levels of 
emotional distress.  This is consistent with other research which has found that 
certain illness representations (e.g., a strong illness identity and beliefs about limited 
control over one’s illness) are related to increased levels of depression and anxiety.  
Therefore, these findings lend support to the contentions of the SRM and would 
therefore be worthwhile of further investigation. 
The next section will describe the clinical implications of the current 
research, including suggestions for future interventions. 
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4.8 Clinical Implications 
Although preliminary, some of the findings from the current study may have 
several important clinical implications.  For example, given the findings that recall of 
fewer integrative memories was associated with higher levels of emotional distress, 
it may be useful to develop or adapt existing interventions for PWD to incorporate 
sessions which focus on the development of an integrative style of reminiscence.  
This could potentially be integrated into current approaches such as CST groups, 
reminiscence therapy, or life review.  In the same vein, Serrano Latorre, Gatz, and 
Montanes (2004) examined the efficacy of life review based on autobiographical 
retrieval practice for treating older people with depression and found significant 
reductions in depression post-treatment in comparison to controls.  However, it is 
recognised that further research is necessary before adapting current techniques.  
Further research may therefore take the form of comparing integrative based 
reminiscence to unguided reminiscence or a control group.  In doing so, it may be 
determined whether this approach will result in higher levels of emotional well-
being.   
 In view of the findings in the current study which indicate that greater AI 
self-discrepancies and dementia-related self-attributes were related to increased 
levels of emotional distress, it may be beneficial for clinicians to focus on techniques 
that assist PWD in maintaining self-consistency (i.e., by helping to preserve their 
sense of self prior to the onset of dementia).  This may be achieved by first 
determining the important roles or attributes that individuals feel they have, or had, 
and using strategies to maximise these.  This may be done with the help of a carer to 
ascertain the most salient features that make up an individual’s sense of self.  
Activities which assist with maintaining these roles or self-attributes, such as helping 
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others or doing work-related tasks, could then be used to bolster the sense of self.  A 
similar intervention encapsulating these ideas has been devised but is still in a 
preliminary stage (see Romero & Wenz, 2001).  In light of the important links 
between thoughts, emotions and behaviour (e.g., Kuyken, 2005) it may also be 
useful for clinicians to use a cognitive-behavioural approach to explore any thoughts 
regarding self-discrepancies that PWD may have and then utilise behavioural 
techniques to address these.   
Some of these types of interventions may be provided by either clinicians or 
carers of PWD.  Indeed, given that others are seen to be integral to the way one sees 
oneself (e.g., Cooley, 1902), which may be particularly pertinent with regards to 
carers who are relatives of PWD, it may be helpful to assist carers in using 
techniques which help PWD to maintain their sense of self.  This is consistent with 
Kitwood’s personhood model (1990, 1996, 1997), in which he contends that having 
a sense of continuity with the past (a self-narrative) is crucial in meeting the needs of 
PWD. 
The next section will outline the limitations of the current study, including 
issues with sampling and the design of the study.  Problems with the measures used 
and data collection will also be discussed in addition to reflections of the research 
process. 
4.9 Research Process 
4.9.1 Critical Review of Methodology 
Several methodological issues need to be considered when interpreting the 
findings of the present study.  First, although the current study was adequately 
powered according to G*Power (Faul et al., 2007), it is possible that significant 
effects were unable to be detected given the small sample size.  Moreover, larger 
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sample sizes are generally preferred in research (Field, 2009).  It is noteworthy, 
however, that the sample size in the present study is comparable to other studies in 
this area of research (e.g., Addis & Tippett, 2004; Naylor & Clare, 2008).   
Second, as the design of the study was correlational in nature, it is not 
possible to determine causality.  That is, it cannot be ascertained if dementia-related 
self-attributes and deficits in integrative memories and AI self-discrepancies are the 
cause of emotional distress or vice versa.  Similarly, it cannot be determined if 
greater AI self-discrepancies cause anxiety and depression or whether it is anxiety 
and depression that create more AI self-discrepancies.  Additionally, it cannot be 
ruled out that these relationships may be attributable to a third variable, such as 
physical illness or life events.  In order to overcome this, longitudinal designs with 
larger samples are necessary to investigate AM, the self and emotional distress in 
PWD. 
Third, in order to avoid making Type 1 errors as a result of producing 
multiple comparisons, Bonferroni corrections were employed for all relevant 
statistical tests.  This meant that some significant findings at alpha level .05 were 
missed.  To avoid needing to make multiple comparisons, future research should 
consider limiting the number of variables of investigation.  Furthermore, using a 
larger, more homogenous sample of PWD, with less variability in cognitive 
functioning and dementia diagnosis, may also prove useful in overcoming these 
difficulties. 
Fourth, the current study employed a convenience sample of PWD that was 
predominately made up of males and none of whom were diagnosed with clinical 
depression or anxiety.  This may have been problematic for several reasons.  For 
example, as already outlined in section 4.3.1, the majority of research examining the 
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relationship between OGM and depression has used samples that are already 
depressed.  In view of this, and the additional aims of the present study to explore 
relationships between self-discrepancies, AM and emotional distress in PWD, it may 
have been more beneficial to select a sample of PWD who were already 
experiencing emotional distress.  Subsequently, the relationships between these 
variables may have been more likely to be detected.  Moreover, the gender 
imbalance in the sample may have attributed to the relatively low levels of 
depression in the sample because males may reject difficult emotions when faced 
with them (e.g., Kingerlee, 2012) and therefore may under-report or minimise their 
distress.  This may be even more pertinent given that emotional distress was assessed 
using a self-report measure, which are notorious for response biases (e.g., Hammond, 
2000).   
Fifth, as documented in section 4.2.1, there were some concerns with the SQ 
measure for assessing self-discrepancies in the current sample.  In addition to these 
issues, the applicability of the SQ to measure self-discrepancies in dementia may be 
questionable as it is not specifically validated for use with this population.  Indeed, 
although the SQ has been used in older adults before (e.g., Francis et al., 2002; 
Heidrich & Powwattana, 2004), the present study is the first to use it in PWD.  
The inherent difficulties in using self and identity tasks with PWD have been 
highlighted by Addis and Tippett (2004) and Naylor and Clare (2008) who used the 
TSCS-II (Fitts & Warren, 1996) and TST (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) to measure 
identity in dementia groups.  Indeed, Addis and Tippett proposed that frontal 
dysfunction in dementia may produce impairments in generation of responses, 
fluency, and retrieval processes, which may be necessary when responding to 
identity tasks, such as articulating one’s sense of self.  However, they argue that 
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these types of deficiencies cannot necessarily be equated with a change in a person’s 
subjective sense of who they are.   
Nevertheless, these impairments, which may be particularly relevant in 
relation to the SQ because of its idiographic approach, may have led to difficulties in 
responding to the SQ in the current sample.  For example, the lead researcher 
observed many participants struggling to articulate adjectives in order to complete 
this task.  Additionally, by the time participants had reached the ought self attributes 
list at the end, responses typically had begun to diminish, which may be one possible 
account for the lower AO self-discrepancies found in the current sample.   
Moreover, given that participants provided attributes verbally on the SQ to 
the lead researcher, this may have led to certain participant biases, such as the 
Hawthorn effect or demand characteristics.  The former involves participants 
responding more favourably to questions because they know they are directly being 
studied (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939).  Similarly, the latter refers to participants 
modifying their responses in line with what they think the researcher wants (Orne, 
1962).  These biases may be particularly pertinent when assessing aspects of the self.  
The issues relating to the assessment of dementia-related self-attributes according to 
the SQ are also important to be considered, which were discussed in section 4.8.1.  
Finally, it is noteworthy that the SDMT has not been used with PWD before 
and therefore required some modification during the research process.  For example, 
although the SDMT only requires the retrieval of five memories from any timeframe, 
which is less onerous than the AMI which requires retrieval of nine memories from 
three specific timeframes, it became clear during the research process that some 
participants found it too cognitively demanding to take in all of the instructions.  
Therefore, it was necessary for the lead researcher to simplify or improvise the 
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instructions where required.  Moreover, sometimes it was necessary to prompt an 
individual to recall a memory or carers would simultaneously do this for the person.  
Nevertheless, the lead researcher attempted to keep this to a minimum.  These 
alterations may have been problematic for several reasons.  First, by shortening the 
instructions specific qualities necessary to obtain a self-defining memory may have 
been missed out, and this is also a departure from the standardised method.  Second, 
the necessity to prompt individuals may have acted as a primer to recount certain 
types of memories, or resulted in more memories being retrieved than would have 
done left unprompted.  This may account, to some extent,  for the high number of 
specific memories recalled in the present sample.  
4.9.2 Reflections on the Research Process  
 It is important to note that the current study underwent several changes from 
the initial research proposal.  First, regression analyses were planned to determine 
the factors that may predict emotional distress in PWD.  However, due to the small 
sample size obtained this was not possible.  If more time and resources were 
available to conduct the current study, the small sample size may have been 
overcome.  Second, additional variables were considered for inclusion in the study, 
including BPSDs and QOL, but it was decided that this was too broad for the scope 
of this study given the allocated timeframes for completion.   
 Numerous challenges throughout the research process should also be noted.  
In particular, recruiting PWD proved extremely difficult due to staff time constraints 
in the recruiting OPCMHTs and lack of consent from prospective participants.  It is 
for these reasons that issues with the size and composition of the sample arose.  As 
discussed in section 4.3.1, measuring self-discrepancies in PWD was also 
problematic and led to several modifications of the original measures (e.g., asking 
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participants to talk out aloud when recalling their memories as opposed to writing 
them down on the SDMT).  This measure and the SQ were also time-intensive and 
participants struggled to complete them without prompting.  For these reasons, it 
would be beneficial for prospective researchers to carefully consider sampling and 
measurement selection in future studies investigating self-discrepancies, AM and 
emotional distress in PWD.  
The next section will describe some possible directions for future research 
based on the findings of the current study.  
4.10 Suggestions for Future Research 
As this was the first study to explore the relationships between AM, the self 
and emotional distress in people with mild dementia, future research would benefit 
from examining these relationships further with a larger, more homogenous and 
gender-balanced sample of PWD.  Specifically, in view of the findings in the current 
study which showed that deficiencies in integrative memories were associated with 
emotional distress, future research may be useful to explore this relationship further.  
It may also be worthwhile for future research to investigate the relationship between 
different aspects of the self and identity (or self-discrepancies using a different 
measure) and integrative memories in people with mild dementia given that no 
relationship was found between the two variables in the current study.  Measures that 
incorporate both participants’ and informants’ views (e.g., a carer) may provide a 
useful insight into these areas, as well as improve the robustness and ecological 
validity of results. 
Similarly, as this was the first study to examine self-discrepancies in PWD, 
and AI self-discrepancies were found to be associated with overall emotional 
distress, it may be a valuable area for prospective investigation.  However, although 
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it seemed appropriate to start with the SQ in research with dementia groups, as it was 
the original measure for self-discrepancies, given the problems documented with it in 
sections 4.2.1 and 4.9.1, it may be useful for future research to attempt to use 
different approaches.  Some alternative measures are available to measure self-
discrepancies, including the Self-Lines measure (Francis et al., 2006) and a modified 
version of the SQ (Rodebaugh & Donahue, 2007), although these measures are still 
in the preliminary stages of being tested for their psychometric properties.  
Another possible measure which may be used in further research is the Head 
Injury Semantic Differential III (HISD-III; Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984).  Although 
it is a measure designed to assess self-discrepancies in people with head injury, it 
may be suitable to be adapted for use in PWD in view of the similar difficulties 
found among these two groups (e.g., cognitive deficits and adjustment difficulties) 
(e.g., Wilson & Gracey, 2009).  The HISD-III enables the assessment of pre-injury 
self, current self and ideal self.  It may be feasible to modify this to use with PWD by 
substituting pre-injury self with pre-diagnosis self.  This measure may also be less 
cognitively taxing for PWD given that adjectives are already supplied, placing less 
onerous on participants to produce self-attributes using free recall.  However, 
echoing the view of Naylor and Clare (2008), future research would benefit from 
identifying the optimal methods for measuring the self and identity in PWD. 
In view of the sampling issues in the current study, future research should 
consider using a sample of emotionally distressed PWD, which may increase the 
likelihood of detecting significant relationships between self-discrepancies, AM and 
emotional distress.  Moreover, it may prove fruitful for future studies to use 
regression analyses to explore the factors that may be associated with emotional 
distress in PWD.  This should enable the most salient factors that contribute to 
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emotional distress to be established and therefore assist in shaping interventions to 
help alleviate emotional distress in PWD.  
Finally, in the current study it was observed during the research process that 
many participants recalled emotive and negative memories.  Previous research has 
suggested that individuals who are depressed have more difficulty in using positive 
autobiographical memories for mood repair (Josephson, Rose, & Singer, 1999–2000; 
Rusting & DeHart, 2000).  Therefore, given that 18.1% of the current sample 
reported depressive symptoms, it may be fruitful for future research to measure the 
affect of self-defining memories in PWD to determine if negative tone in memories 
is indeed related to depression.  This could have important clinical implications if a 
relationship is found in terms of assisting PWD to retrieve positive autobiographical 
memories via life review approaches. 
The following section will outline the overall conclusions of the present 
study. 
4.11 Conclusion  
The current study is the first to investigate the relationships between AM, 
self-discrepancies and emotional distress in PWD.  The findings from the present 
study add to the existing literature exploring the emotional impact of dementia by 
providing preliminary evidence in three areas.  First, they indicate that AI self-
discrepancies are associated with emotional distress in people with mild dementia, 
suggesting that incongruence between the actual self (self-concept) and ideal self-
states are related to higher levels of combined anxiety and depression.  Second, they 
suggest that emotional distress in people with mild dementia is related to deficits in 
AM, namely in the form of impaired recall of integrative memories.  This indicates 
that the inability to produce meaning from autobiographical memories is associated 
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with higher levels of emotional distress.  Third, they show that more dementia-
related self-attributes (i.e., a stronger illness identity) are associated with higher 
levels of emotional distress.  That is, the more an individual describes themselves in 
terms of their dementing illness, the more likely they are to experience emotional 
distress. 
The overall findings of this study suggest that PWD may cope with the 
disease by using strategies that lie somewhere on a continuum between self-adjusting 
and self-maintaining (Clare, 2003), and which consequently may either mediate or 
moderate emotional distress.  Indeed, for individuals who experienced AI self-
discrepancies and reported more dementia-related self-attributes, it is possible that 
they were using a self-adjusting strategy (i.e., by incorporating the changes 
associated with dementia into their current self-concept), which may in fact induce 
emotional distress.  However, given that emotional distress did not appear to be as 
strongly related to AO self-discrepancies in the current sample, it is plausible that, to 
some extent, participants were adopting a psychological defence mechanism or self-
maintaining strategy (Clare, 2003; Naylor & Clare, 2008), which may serve to 
protect against emotional distress.  The current findings therefore have theoretical 
implications for the application of SDT, narrative models of autobiographical 
memory and the self, and the SRM of adjustment to illness in the understanding of 
emotional distress in PWD.   
However, whatever the association between AM, the self and emotional 
distress in PWD, it is clear that the relationships are far from straightforward.  In 
light of this, and similar to the study by Jetten et al. (2010), future research may 
attempt to identify and explore other factors that may mediate or moderate emotional 
distress in people with mild dementia. 
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School of Medicine, Health 
Policy and Practice 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich  
NR4 7TJ 
United Kingdom 
 
Email:L.Christoforou-
Hazelwood @uea.ac.uk 
Tel:  01603 593310 
Fax:  01603 593604 
Mobile: xxx 
 
January 2011 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: Psychological Research in Dementia – A Request for Participants 
I am a trainee clinical psychologist undertaking a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
at the University of East Anglia. I am writing to you to highlight some research that I 
am conducting from January to May 2011 exploring the factors that may be 
associated with emotional distress in people with mild dementia. 
This project aims to contribute to psychological understanding of the experiences of 
people with dementia. It is also hoped that it will go on to inform future 
interventions to help people with dementia. I would like to request clients that you 
feel may be interested in taking part in the study and who may be suitable in light of 
the inclusion criteria (please see attached). I have also attached a Participant 
Information Sheet, which provides detailed information about what the study 
involves. The research has received ethical approval from Norfolk Research Ethics 
Committee. 
It would be helpful if I could arrange a time to come and speak to your team to talk 
about the research and hand out some Participant Information Sheets for staff to pass 
on to interested and suitable clients. It would also be useful if I could put up a poster 
advertising the study in your waiting room(s) (please see attached). 
If you would like to find out more about the study, please call me on xxx or email 
me at L.Christoforou-Hazelwood@uea.ac.uk  I will contact you again shortly to see 
when it may be convenient to come and speak with your team and to see if you are 
happy for me advertise the study. 
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Many thanks for your time. 
Best wishes, 
 
Lorna Christoforou-Hazelwood 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Supervised by Dr Laura Jobson, Clinical Psychologist & Lecturer, University of East 
Anglia 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
An Exploratory Analysis of the Factors associated 
with Emotional Distress in People with Mild 
Dementia 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before 
you decide whether you wish to participate, it is important for 
you to understand why the research is being done and what it 
will involve. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully. Talk to others about the study if you wish.  
 
Please ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you 
would like more information. Take time to decide whether or 
not you wish to take part. 
 
1. What is the purpose of the study? 
The study is being conducted as part of my training in 
fulfilment of a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology at the 
University of East Anglia. 
  
People who have dementia can experience a range of 
difficulties, which may affect the way that they feel. The aim of 
the current study is to explore whether a person’s memory and 
their beliefs about themselves may affect their emotions. 
 
2. Why have I been chosen?  
You have been chosen because you have a mild form of 
dementia of the Alzheimer’s, vascular or mixed type. 
 
3. Do I have to take part? 
No. It is your choice if you wish to take part. If you decide not 
to, your treatment or any service that you are receiving will not 
be affected in any way.  
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You can also withdraw from the study at any time and this will 
not affect your treatment or any service that you are receiving.  
However, if you do chose to withdraw from the study after you 
have taken part, it will not be possible to remove your data 
from the study. 
4. What will happen to me if I do take part? 
If you decide to take part I will first go through any questions 
that you may have about the study.  I will also ask you some 
questions to check that you are suitable for the study.  
 
If you choose to proceed, I will arrange a time and place that is 
convenient for you to complete the assessments which look at 
your memory, the beliefs you have about yourself and your 
emotions. You are welcome to have a friend or relative with 
you at the meeting. 
 
At the beginning of the meeting I will ask you to complete a 
Consent Form indicating that you are still happy to participate.  
 
To assist healthcare professionals in knowing about the study, a 
letter will also be sent to your key healthcare/support worker 
(where applicable) and your General Practitioner (GP) to 
inform them about your participation in the study. A copy of 
this letter will be shown to you.  
 
The whole meeting should take approximately 60-70 minutes. 
Some assessments require you to answer questions on your 
own and others will involve a brief structured interview with 
me. I will be with you for the whole duration to answer any 
questions.  
 
5. What are the possible risks or disadvantages of taking 
part? 
It is unlikely that there will be any adverse risks to you for 
taking part in the study. However, if you feel that completing 
the assessments has caused you any distress, I will be available 
to talk about any concerns you may have.  
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If this is not sufficient I would advise you to talk to your key 
healthcare/support worker (where applicable) or visit your GP. 
  
6. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
The benefits to taking part in the study are helping to contribute 
to psychological understanding of the factors that may 
influence emotional distress in people with mild dementia.   
 
The findings may also be used to inform future treatments to 
help people with dementia.  
 
7. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All of the information collected about you will be kept strictly 
confidential and will only be seen by myself and my research 
supervisor, Dr Laura Jobson.  
 
You will not be able to be identified from any information that 
you give.  Storage and use of information in this study will be 
fully compliant with the Data Protection Act. 
 
8. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
Following completion of the assessments, I will write a report 
about the research, which will be published.  
 
You will not be able to be identified from any information in 
this report.  
 
You will be given the opportunity to be sent a summary of the 
findings of the study if you wish. 
 
9. Complaints 
If you have any concerns about the study, please first contact 
me (my details are below).  
 
153 
 
If you remain unsatisfied and wish to complain formally about 
the way you have been approached or treated in the study, you 
can do this through the NHS Complaints Procedure.  
 
You may also contact your local NHS Patient Advice and 
Liaison Service (PALS) for any advice concerning the study. 
 
0800 279 7257 (Norfolk)     
0800 376 0775 (Cambridge & Peterborough)     
0800 585544 (Suffolk) 
 
10. Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed by Norfolk Research Ethics 
Committee and has received ethical approval. 
 
11. Contact details 
For further information about this study, please contact the 
researcher: 
Lorna Christoforou-Hazelwood, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Supervised by Dr Laura Jobson, Clinical Psychologist & 
Lecturer 
 
School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich NR4 7TJ 
 
Telephone: 01603 593310 
Fax: 01603 593604  
Mobile: xxx 
 
Email: L.Christoforou-Hazelwood@uea.ac.uk   
L.Jobson@uea.ac.uk 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. 
If you decide to participate in the research, you will be given a 
copy of this sheet to keep. 
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RESEARCH INTO THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS IN MILD DEMENTIA 
 
Would you like to take part in a study 
looking at memory, identity and emotions? 
 
Who should take part? 
We are looking for people who: 
 have a mild form of dementia of the Alzheimer’s, 
vascular or mixed type 
 are already receiving care from a clinical service for 
their dementia 
Interested? 
If you are interested in taking part in the study, or would like 
further information, please contact Lorna Christoforou-
Hazelwood (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) on: xxx or email me 
at: L.Christoforou-Hazelwood@uea.ac.uk 
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CONSENT FORM TO PASS ON CONTACT DETAILS 
I agree for my contact details to be passed on to Lorna Christoforou-Hazelwood, 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist, to be contacted by her for the purposes of her 
research. 
 
Name:______________________________________________________ 
Contact Number:______________________________________________ 
Email address (if applicable):____________________________________ 
Signature:___________________________________________________ 
Date:_______________________________________________________ 
Name of Healthcare/Support Worker or GP (where applicable): 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Signature:___________________________________________________________ 
Date:_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Please return to: Lorna Christoforou-Hazelwood, C/O Karensa Rands, Senior 
Administrative Assistant, Elizabeth Fry Building, Room 2.30, School of Medicine, 
Health Policy and Practice, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ 
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Participant number: ____________  Age: ___________  
 
Please answer the following questions about yourself (please tick where 
appropriate) 
 
Are you?    Male         
Female 
What is your marital status? _____________________________ 
How would you describe your 
ethnic origin? _____________________________ 
 
What is your level of education? Some secondary    
GCSEs or O-Levels           
A-Levels   
Diploma            
Undergraduate / Postgraduate 
 
Are you in employment?  None             
Voluntary           
Paid 
 
What type of dementia 
have you been diagnosed with? Alzheimer’s Disease 
            
Vascular dementia            
 
Mixed dementia 
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Do you have a carer?  Yes        
No 
 
If Yes, who is this?   Spouse 
(please tick all that apply)     
Child          
Other relative       
Friend  
Paid carer             
Other               
If other, please state:  
____________________________ 
 
Where do you live? At home 
 
 Residential Care Home 
  
Other 
 
If other, please state:  
 
_____________________________ 
 
 
Who do you live with?  Spouse 
(please tick all that apply)     
Child          
Other relative       
Friend  
Paid carer             
Other               
If other, please state:  
____________________________ 
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What services are you currently  Memory clinic          
using? (please tick all that apply)  
 GP 
 
Older People’s Community 
Mental Health Team      
 
Alzheimer’s Society 
 
Other charity (e.g., Age 
UK) 
 
Residential Care  
 
Day care centre     
 
Other             
 
If other, please 
state:_____________________________ 
 
 
How long ago were you  
diagnosed with dementia?  
(please state in months)  ___________________________ months 
 
 
Have you ever suffered with  Yes 
a mental illness prior to being  
diagnosed with dementia?   No 
 
 
If Yes, please state which  
mental illness:  
 
__________________________________________ 
 
 
Are you on any dementia  Yes        
medication?   
     No 
 
If Yes, please state what: 
__________________________________________ 
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Are you taking part in any   Yes 
other studies and/or  
interventions (e.g., dementia  No   
medication trial or Cognitive 
Stimulation Therapy)?    
 
 
If Yes, please state what 
the study/intervention  
is called:   
 
___________________________________________ 
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Appendix G 
Selves Questionnaire (SQ) 
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Instructions 
 
In the following questionnaire, you will be asked to list the attributes of the 
type of person you think you actually, ideally, and ought to be. 
 
Actual self: Your beliefs concerning the attributes you think you actually 
possess. 
 
Ideal self: Your beliefs concerning the attributes you would like ideally to 
possess; your ultimate goals for yourself. 
 
Ought self: Your beliefs concerning the attributes you believe you should or 
ought to possess; your normative rules or prescriptions for yourself. 
 
 
 Please list 10 words that describe you (Actual self): 
         Slightly             Extremely 
 1    1  2  3  4  
 2    1  2  3  4 
 3    1  2  3  4  
 4    1  2  3  4 
 5    1  2  3  4 
 6    1  2  3  4 
 7    1  2  3  4 
 8    1  2  3  4 
 9    1  2  3  4 
 10    1  2  3  4 
 
 Now please circle a number above to indicate HOW MUCH each 
attribute you feel is like you (1 = slightly, 4 = extremely) 
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Ideal self: Your beliefs concerning the attributes you would like ideally to 
possess; your ultimate goals for yourself. 
 
 
 Please list 10 words that describe how you would ideally like to be 
(Ideal self): 
         Slightly             Extremely 
 1    1  2  3  4  
 2    1  2  3  4 
 3    1  2  3  4  
 4    1  2  3  4 
 5    1  2  3  4 
 6    1  2  3  4 
 7    1  2  3  4 
 8    1  2  3  4 
 9    1  2  3  4 
 10    1  2  3  4 
 
 Now please circle a number above to indicate HOW MUCH of each  
 attribute you feel you would like to have (1 = slightly, 4 = extremely) 
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Ought self: Your beliefs concerning the attributes you believe you should or 
ought to possess; your normative rules or prescriptions for yourself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE NOW STOP AND TELL THE RESEARCHER YOU HAVE 
FINISHED. 
Please list 10 words that describe how you feel you ought to be (Ought 
self): 
                   Slightly             Extremely 
1    1  2  3  4  
2    1  2  3  4 
3    1  2  3  4  
4    1  2  3  4 
5    1  2  3  4 
6    1  2  3  4 
7    1  2  3  4 
8    1  2  3  4 
9    1  2  3  4 
10    1  2  3  4 
 
Now please circle a number above to indicate HOW MUCH of each 
attribute you feel you ought to have (1 = slightly, 4 = extremely) 
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Appendix H 
Self-defining memory task (SDMT) 
171 
 
Instructions 
This part of the task concerns the recall of a special kind of personal memory 
called a self-defining memory. A self-defining memory has the following 
attributes: 
 
1. It is at least one year old. 
 
2. It is a memory from your life that you remembered very clearly 
and that still feels important to you even as you think about it. 
 
3. It is a memory about an important enduring theme, issue, or 
conflict from your life. It is a memory that helps explain who you 
are as an individual and might be the memory you would tell 
someone else if you wanted that person to understand you in a 
profound way. 
 
4. It is a memory linked to other similar memories that share the 
same theme or concern. 
 
5. It may be a memory that is positive or negative, or both, in how 
it makes you feel. The only important aspect is that it leads to 
strong feelings. 
 
6. It is a memory that you have thought about many times. It 
should be familiar to you like a picture you have studied or a 
song (happy or sad) you have learned by heart. 
 
To understand best what a self-defining memory is, imagine you have just 
met someone you like very much and are going for a walk together. Each of 
you is very committed to helping the other get to know the “Real You”. You 
are not trying to play a role or to strike a pose. While, inevitably, we say 
things that present a picture of ourselves that might not be completely 
accurate, imagine that you are making every effort to be honest. In the 
course of the conversation, you describe a memory that you feel conveys 
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powerfully how you have come to be the person you currently are. It is 
precisely this memory, which you tell the other person and simultaneously 
repeat to yourself, that constitutes a self-defining memory. 
 
On the following pages you will be asked to recall and write 5 self-defining 
memories. 
 
Please write down 5 self-defining memories that you can recall based on the 
instructions overleaf. 
 
1. ________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
  
 
 
 
 
2. ________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
  
 
 
 
 
3. ________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
Approximate date of above memory: 
Approximate date of above memory: 
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________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. ________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
5. ________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
 
Approximate date of above memory: 
Approximate date of above memory: 
Approximate date of above memory: 
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Please go back and recall your first self-defining memory. Using the rating 
scale below, please indicate how you felt today in recalling and thinking 
about your memory: 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Not at all   Moderately   Extremely 
        
1. Happy 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
2. Sad 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
3. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
4. Fearful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
5. Surprised 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
6. Ashamed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
7. Disgusted 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
8. Guilty 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
9. Interested 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
10. Embarrassed 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
11. Contemptful 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
12. Proud 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Now please rate how vividly you recalled the memory: 
 
Vivid 
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Not at all   Moderately   Extremely 
 
 
Now please rate how important the memory is to you: 
 
Important 
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Not at all   Moderately   Extremely 
 
 
PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU HAVE NOT LEFT ANY ANSWERS BLANK 
THANK YOU! 
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Appendix I 
Participant Consent Form 
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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
 
An Exploratory Analysis of the Factors associated with Emotional 
Distress in People with Mild Dementia 
 
Lead researcher: Lorna Christoforou-Hazelwood, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Supervised by: Dr Laura Jobson, Clinical Psychologist & Lecturer 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice 
University of East Anglia 
 
Please initial each box and sign at the bottom if you agree to participate. 
    
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet  
dated ___________ for the above study. I have had the opportunity 
to consider the information, ask questions and have had these 
answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am 
free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, and without  
my medical care or legal rights being affected.  
 
3. I have been informed that the confidentiality of the information 
I provide will be safeguarded. 
 
4. I understand that relevant sections of my data collected during  
the study may be looked at by individuals from regulatory authorities 
where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give  
permission for these individuals to have access to my records. 
 
5. I understand that a letter will be sent to my healthcare/support  
worker (where applicable) and my GP informing them of my  
participation in the study. 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above study.      
 
Name of Participant: …………………………………………………. 
 
Signature: …………………………………………………................. 
 
Date: …………………………………………………......................... 
 
If you decide to participate in the research, you will be given a copy of this 
sheet to keep. 
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Appendix J 
Letter to GP / Healthcare Worker 
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School of Medicine, Health 
Policy and Practice 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich  
NR4 7TJ 
United Kingdom 
 
Email:l.christoforou-
hazelwood@uea.ac.uk 
Tel:  01603 593310 
Fax:  01603 593604 
Mobile: xxx 
                                                                                 
                                                                                                                              
 
 
Date: ________________ 
 
 
Dear GP / Healthcare Worker,  
 
 
RE: Patient Participation in a Study Exploring the Factors Associated with 
Emotional Distress in People with Mild Dementia 
 
 
I am writing to inform you that your patient, ______________________________, 
has recently participated in a study exploring the factors associated with emotional 
distress for people who are suffering from mild dementia. The research is being 
conducted as part of my Doctoral research project at the University of East Anglia 
and has been approved by Norfolk Research Ethics Committee.  
 
Taking part in the study involved participants’ completing a questionnaire booklet, 
asking them about their memory, the beliefs they have about themselves and their 
emotions. Although participants should not have found these tasks distressing, they 
have been encouraged to contact you as their assigned GP/ healthcare worker GP if 
they do experience any distress. I am therefore advising you of your patient’s 
participation in the study. 
 
If you have any questions about this, or the research in general, please do not hesitate 
to contact me. 
Best wishes, 
 
Lorna Christoforou-Hazelwood 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Supervised by Dr Laura Jobson, Clinical Psychologist & Lecturer (University of 
East Anglia) 
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Appendix K 
Scatterplots for Primary Hypotheses
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Figure 2. Scatterplot of total scores on the HADS and AI self-
discrepancies 
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Figure 3. Scatterplot of total scores on the HADS and AO self-
discrepancies 
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Figure 4. Scatterplot of depression scores on the HADS and AM 
specificity  
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Figure 5. Scatterplot of total scores on the HADS and AM 
integration 
